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LIST OF PARTIES 
The following is a complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose 
order is sought to be reviewed: 
Mariposa Express, Inc.; Cold Spring Investments, LLC; Cold Spring 
Investments No. 1, Limited Partnership; Cold Spring Investments No. 2, Limited 
Partnership; Newburyport Capital, LLC; Hannah Enterprises, Inc.; USS Holdings, 
LLC; USS Columbia, LLC; Metro Mar Ventures LLC; Michael Jones, LLC; Stirling 
LLC; Michaelson Ventures Inc.; USS O'Brien, Inc.; USS Highland Park, Inc.; Sharon 
McWilliams; George Ammirato; William Demet; Robert Harris; Michael Jones; Ted 
Michaelson; Jim O'Brien; and Stefan Triandafilou (collectively, the "Mariposa Group" 
or "Appellants").1 
United Shipping Solutions, LLC ("USS"); USS Logistics, LLC ("USSL"); Robert 
Ross, Charles Derr; and Jesse Moore (collectively, the "USS Parties" or "Appellees"). 
Following the issuance of the arbitrator's decision in an arbitration between the 
parties that concluded in February 2012 and the filing of Appellants' brief, Appellants 
Sharon Mc Williams, Mariposa Express, Inc., Ted Michaelson, Stirling LLC, and 
Michaelson Ventures, Inc. indicated, through counsel, that they were no longer 
participating in any post-arbitration motions or other issues related to the dispute between 
the parties. Ms. Mc Williams and Mariposa Express, Inc. paid to the USS Parties the 
amounts determined by the arbitrator and have committed to pay their portions of the 
attorneys' fees and costs determined by the arbitrator. Similarly, Mr. Michaelson, 
Stirling LLC and Michaelson Ventures, Inc. have accepted the amounts determined by 
the arbitrator and have made payments and payment arrangements (including executing 
promissory notes) with the USS Parties to pay those amounts. Accordingly, it is the USS 
Parties' understanding that Ms. Mc Williams, Mariposa Express, Inc., Mr. Michaelson, 
Stirling LLC, and Michaelson Ventures, Inc. are no longer participating in this appeal. 
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L JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)0) (Supp. 2011). 
II. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the district court correctly granted the USS Parties' Motion to 
Compel Mandatory Arbitration (the "Motion") by holding that the parties9 dispute was 
subject to the mandatory arbitration provision of the parties' settlement agreement. 
Standard of Review: "[W]hether a trial court correctly decided a motion to 
compel arbitration is a question of law which [the Court] review[s] for correctness, 
according no deference to the trial judge." Cent. Fla. Invs., Inc. v. ParkwestAssocs., 
2002UT3,1|l0,40P.3d599.2 
Preservation for Appeal: The USS Parties do not dispute that Appellants 
preserved the above issue for appeal. To the extent Appellants are seeking to argue 
matters beyond the issue set forth above, the USS Parties do not agree that Appellants 
preserved those matters for appeal. 
The issue on appeal concerns only whether the district court correctly granted the 
USS Parties' Motion. The USS Parties' Motion was not brought pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Nor did the Mariposa Group raise the 
district court's dismissal as an issue for appeal. Therefore, contrary to the Mariposa 
Group's argument, the standard of review governing motions to dismiss does not apply, 
and the only standard of review applicable to this appeal is the standard for the review of 
motions to compel arbitration. 
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III. DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OR 
PROVISIONS CENTRAL TO THIS APPEAL 
Utah Code Ann, § 78B-11-108(1): "On motion of a person showing an agreement 
to arbitrate and alleging another person's refusal to arbitrate pursuant to the agreement... 
the court shall proceed summarily to decide the issue and order the parties to arbitrate 
unless it finds that there is no enforceable agreement to arbitrate." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-108(4): "The court may not refuse to order arbitration 
because the claim subject to arbitration lacks merit or grounds for the claim have not 
been established." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-107(2): "The court shall decide whether an agreement 
to arbitrate exists or a controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-107(3): "An arbitrator shall decide whether a condition 
precedent to arbitrability has been fulfilled and whether a contract containing a valid 
agreement to arbitrate is enforceable." 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below 
From February 16, 2011 to June 2011, and pursuant to a settlement agreement 
between the USS Parties and a group of former franchisees (the "Mariposa Franchisees"), 
the USS Parties attempted to have the Mariposa Franchisees identify what amounts, if 
any, they disputed as owing to the USS Parties under an indemnification provision in the 
parties' settlement agreement. When certain of the Mariposa Franchisees (the Mariposa 
Group) took the position that they owed nothing under the indemnification provision, the 
USS Parties sent a "Dispute Notice," which, under the settlement agreement, triggered an 
expedited arbitration process. On July 12, 2011, and in anticipation of that notice, the 
Mariposa Group filed a complaint ("the Complaint") in Third District Court, seeking to 
avoid the arbitration process to which they had agreed. 
On August 1, 2011, the USS Parties filed the Motion, asking the district court to 
compel arbitration of the parties' dispute. The Mariposa Group filed an opposition to the 
Motion and, after full briefing, the district court heard oral argument on the Motion on 
August 19, 2011. (See R. 807 (Transcript of Oral Argument regarding Motion), a full 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B.) At the end of the hearing, the district 
court determined that, as a matter of law, the terms of the settlement agreement required 
the parties to resolve their dispute through the arbitration procedure contained in the 
settlement agreement. (R. 807 at 28:7-20) ("I think [the arbitration provisions of the 
settlement agreement] are broad enough to allow for the kinds of information [the 
Mariposa Group] think[s] they need to see So I think as a matter of law, that's the 
way I see and~and read this—this agreement to engage in arbitration.").3 The district 
3
 The Mariposa Group correctly notes that the district court made no findings of 
fact, but claims that the court treated the motion as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and 
"did not consider any documents outside of the pleadings . . . . " (Aplts.' Brief at 3). 
Both contentions are incorrect, but ultimately irrelevant. 
On a motion to compel arbitration, a district court is not limited to the standard of 
review imposed by Rule 12(b)(6). The court may consider evidence and make findings 
of fact as necessary. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §78B-11-107 & 108. In this case, while 
the district court considered the materials submitted by the parties (see R. 807 at 11:16-
19; Order at 2, attached hereto as Exhibit C), it concluded that no findings of fact were 
(continued...) 
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court entered a formal written order memorializing its ruling on September 6, 2011 (the 
"Order"). The Order provides, in pertinent part, as follows: "The Motion is granted. 
The parties are ordered to arbitrate their dispute in accordance with the arbitration 
procedures set forth in Paragraph I.e. of the Settlement Agreement." (See Order, 
attached hereto as Exhibit C.) The Mariposa Group filed a Notice of Appeal on 
September 16, 20ll.4 
(... continued) 
necessary because the parties' dispute, no matter how it was characterized by the 
Mariposa Group, was, as a matter of law, subject to the arbitration provision of the 
Settlement Agreement. (R. 807 at 28:4-10; 18-20). In other words, regardless of whether 
the dispute concerned the question of whether the Mariposa Group's indemnification 
obligation had been triggered or whether the Mariposa Group owed any or all of the 
amounts alleged by the USS Parties, the dispute was within the scope of the arbitration 
provision. Given this, the district court's order dismissing the case was not a Rule 
12(b)(6) dismissal, as the Mariposa Group claims, but a recognition that the dispute was 
not properly before the court and had to be dismissed in favor of arbitration. 
The Appellants' attempt to cast the district court in an unfavorable light by 
asserting that the district court did not review the documents submitted by the parties is 
unfair. (See Aplts.' Brief at 3.) Specifically, the Mariposa Group cites to the following 
statement by the district court and implies that the court did not read the materials 
submitted by the parties: "Well, to be quite honest with everybody, I didn't read all this 
stuff, I flipped through it." (Id.) What the district court was referring to in this statement 
was not the briefing, the Complaint, or the Settlement Agreement. Rather, the court was 
referencing certain of the exhibits attached to the parties' briefing. 
4
 After the Mariposa Group filed its Notice of Appeal (and after some further 
delay by the Mariposa Group), the parties ultimately arbitrated their dispute before an 
agreed-upon arbitrator on January 31, February 7, and February 13, 2012. On February 
22, 2012, the arbitrator issued a Memorandum Decision ordering the Mariposa Group to 
pay the USS Parties $1,162,320.08, plus costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. On 
February 28, 2012 (six days after the Memorandum Decision), the Mariposa Group filed 
their opening appellate brief. 
B. Statement of the Facts 
1. The Mariposa Franchisees Fail to Pay USS for Shipping Services Provided by 
DHL, and USS Is Forced to Pay for Those Services. 
USS owns a franchise system that resells shipping services. Prior to November 
2008, each of the Mariposa Group owned one or more franchises in the USS franchise 
system and resold shipping services to customers, using discounted rates USS and its 
affiliate USS Logistics, LLC ("USSL") had negotiated with third-party shipping carriers. 
(R. 4-5, 149, 192-93). The primary provider of domestic and international shipping 
services to the USS franchise system was DHL Express (USA), Inc. ("DHL"), which 
provided these services to the USS franchise system under a reseller agreement (the 
"Reseller Agreement") with USSL. (R. 149, 172). Under the Reseller Agreement and 
the franchise agreements between the franchisees and USS, each franchisee was required 
to pay USS for the services provided by DHL, and USS then tendered a collective 
payment for the franchise system to DHL. (R. 149, 175). 
In 2008, DHL decided to cease domestic shipping operations in the United States 
and, on November 10, 2008, breached the Reseller Agreement by announcing that it 
would discontinue all express and ground shipping services in the United States by 
January 30, 2009. (R. 5, 149). Following DHL's announcement, the Mariposa 
Franchisees unilaterally decided to stop paying USS for the DHL shipping services 
provided to their customers, even though their customers continued to ship with DHL. 
(R. 150). As a result of their non-payment, USS terminated the franchises of the 
Mariposa Franchisees. (Id). 
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2. The DHL Lawsuit and the Mariposa Lawsuit. 
On December 22, 2008, USSL, and in a later amended complaint USS and certain 
of its franchisees, filed suit against DHL in Utah State Court, entitled USS Logistics, 
LLC, et al v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., Case No. 080926254 (the "DHL Lawsuit"). In 
the DHL Lawsuit, USS and USSL alleged, among other things, that DHL had breached 
the Reseller Agreement and caused the USS franchise system to incur significant 
damages. (R. 150, 192-93). DHL answered the complaint and asserted a counterclaim 
against USSL, claiming that USSL was liable for the unpaid shipping services which the 
Mariposa Franchisees and their customers received, but for which they had not paid. (R. 
150, 193). On March 31, 2009, the Mariposa Franchisees filed their own lawsuit against 
DHL in New York Supreme Court (the "Franchisee Lawsuit"), claiming that DHL was 
liable to the Mariposa Franchisees for breaching the Reseller Agreement. (R. 5, 150, 
193). 
In anticipation of the DHL Lawsuit, on December 3, 2008, the Mariposa 
Franchisees filed a lawsuit against the USS Parties in Utah State Court, entitled Mariposa 
Express, Inc., et al v. United Shipping Solutions, etaL, Case No. 080925017 (the 
"Mariposa Lawsuit"). (R. 5, 151, 192). In the Mariposa Lawsuit, the Mariposa 
Franchisees sought to avoid all of their franchise obligations under their franchise 
agreements with USS. (R. 151). The USS Parties answered the complaint and 
counterclaimed, seeking to enforce the franchise obligations of the Mariposa Franchisees 
and to obtain payment for unpaid freight and DHL shipments provided to them and their 
customers under the USS franchise system. (R. 151,192, 268). 
On December 16, 2008, the district court in the Mariposa Lawsuit entered a 
temporary restraining order (the "TRO") which required, among other things, that 
(1) "[The Mariposa Franchisees] shall not further solicit employees of [USS and USSL]"; 
(2) "[The Mariposa Franchisees] are not relieved of any other post-termination 
obligations and shall not use or disclose any of [USS or USSL's] confidential or 
proprietary information in any way"; (3) "[The Mariposa Franchisees] shall discontinue 
all use of [USS and USSL's] trademarks and any claimed association with [their] 
franchise system." (R. 151, 308). 
On June 9, 2009, and because of evidence indicating that the Mariposa 
Franchisees had violated the TRO, the district court entered an Order Regarding Motion 
for Order to Show Cause Why Plaintiffs Should Not Be Held in Civil Contempt for 
Violating This Court's Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining 
Order and Sanctioned in Connection Therewith. (R. 151-52,314). In the order to show 
cause, the district court enjoined the Mariposa Franchisees "from using or charging 
shipments to USS's accounts with its shipping providers." (R. 152). The court also 
scheduled an evidentiary hearing to determine whether certain of the Mariposa 
Franchisees should be held in contempt and, if so, the appropriate sanction. (Id). 
On September 1, 2009, the district court held the evidentiary hearing in the 
Mariposa Lawsuit. At the end of the hearing, the district court ruled that certain of the 
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Mariposa Franchisees, in particular Robert Harris and Sharon Mc Williams—both parties 
to this case—violated the TRO. (R. 152, 354). After granting the motion for contempt, 
the district court took under advisement the question of the appropriate sanctions to 
impose and proceeded with a multi-day evidentiary hearing on the parties' cross-motions 
for preliminary injunction. (R. 153, 354). Near the end of that hearing, but before the 
district court had imposed contempt sanctions, the Mariposa Franchisees approached the 
USS Parties about settling the Mariposa Lawsuit. (R. 153). 
3. The Parties Enter into the Settlement Agreement and Agree to Resolve 
Disputes through Expedited Arbitration. 
On September 15, 2009, the USS Parties and the Mariposa Franchisees settled the 
Mariposa Lawsuit by entering into a settlement agreement (the "Settlement Agreement"). 
(R. 6, 197; see also Settlement Agreement, attached as Exhibit A to Aplts.' Brief). In the 
Settlement Agreement, the Mariposa Franchisees agreed, among other things, to make 
three types of payments to the USS Parties. Specifically, the Mariposa Franchisees 
agreed to pay the USS Parties a settlement payment. (R. 197; see also Settlement 
Agreement f 4). In addition, the Mariposa Franchisees agreed to pay USS for all 
amounts owing for unpaid freight shipments made by them or their customers. (R. 153, 
193; Settlement Agreement Tf 1). Finally, the Mariposa Franchisees agreed to indemnify 
the USS Parties against any amounts the LFSS Parties were determined to owe DHL for 
unpaid shipping services provided to the Mariposa Franchisees or their customers, 
regardless of whether that determination was through judgment or settlement of the DHL 
Lawsuit. (R. 6, 154, 196; Settlement Agreement f^ 3). All other matters between the 
parties were resolved and the Mariposa Lawsuit was dismissed. (R. 6,153,200; 
Settlement Agreement T| 8). 
To determine the outstanding amount owing for freight services, the parties agreed 
in the Settlement Agreement that the USS Parties would provide the Mariposa 
Franchisees with access to certain shipping data (the "CAMS Data").5 (R. 153, 193-94; 
Settlement Agreement ^ 1 .a). After disclosure of the CAMS Data, the Mariposa 
Franchisees were given time to review that data and indicate whether they disputed the 
amounts showing in the CAMS Data. (R. 193-94; Settlement Agreement *f La). If a 
dispute arose, and because the USS Parties did not want to incur the expense and time 
associated with further litigation to resolve any disputes, the USS Parties insisted, and the 
Mariposa Franchisees agreed, that any dispute concerning the freight amounts, including 
whether any amount was owed at all, would "be fully and finally resolved exclusively by 
binding arbitration," as set forth in Paragraph 1(c) of the Settlement Agreement—the 
mandatory arbitration provision. (R. 154, 195; Settlement Agreement f l.c). 
With regard to the Mariposa Franchisees' indemnification obligation to the USS 
Parties, Paragraph 3 of the Settlement Agreement provides as follows: 
[T]he respective Mariposa Franchisees agree to indemnify and hold USS 
harmless for any and all amounts the USS Parties are determined to owe 
5
 The Settlement Agreement defines CAMS Data as "copies of the [USS] 
corporate payment screen and open franchise invoices for their respective franchises, 
showing the amounts USS believes each Mariposa Franchisee owes for . . . Services 
provided to each respective Mariposa Franchisee and/or his, her or its customers (the 
"CAMS Data"). (R. 193; Settlement Agreement f La.). 
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DHL through judgment or settlement for DHL services provided to the 
respective Mariposa Franchisees and/or their customers and which the 
respective Mariposa Franchisees or their customers have not already paid to 
USS or DHL {regardless of whether that determination is by judgment or 
through settlement and regardless of whether the amount is determined 
through set-off amounts that may reduce any judgment in favor of the USS 
Parties and against DHL). The respective Mariposa Franchisees further 
agree to pay to USS all royalties, Wasatch Billing fees, and late fees charged 
by DHL resulting from non-payment by the respective Mariposa 
Franchisees, on the shipments the USS Parties are determined to owe to 
DHL. 
(R. 154, 196; Settlement Agreement If 3) (emphases added). As with the unpaid freight 
amounts, the parties agreed that, for purposes of determining any amounts owed by the 
Mariposa Franchisees for DHL shipments under the indemnification provision, the USS 
Parties would "provide the Mariposa Franchisees with access to the CAMS Data . . . 
necessary to show the DHL Services provided to the Mariposa Franchisees and/or their 
customers.5' (R. 154-55, 196; Settlement Agreement Tf3.a). Again, because the USS 
Parties wanted to avoid a ftirther lawsuit in the event of any dispute concerning amounts 
owing under the indemnification provision, the USS Parties insisted and the Mariposa 
Franchisees agreed that any disputes concerning the amounts owed to the USS Parties 
under the indemnification provision, including whether any amount was owed, would be 
resolved through the same expedited arbitration procedure used to resolve freight 
disputes: 
If the Mariposa Franchisees do not agree with the amount identified by 
the USS Parties, the USS Parties shall nevertheless have the right to 
proceed with the settlement and any dispute between the USS Parties and 
the Mariposa Franchisees concerning these amounts shall be resolved in 
accordance with the dispute resolution procedure set forth in Paragraph 
Lc above. Likewise, if the USS Parties are determined to owe DHL, 
through a judgment, any amount for services provided to the Mariposa 
Franchisees and/or their customers, any dispute between the USS Parties 
and the Mariposa Franchisees concerning such amounts shall be 
resolve[d] in accordance with the dispute resolution procedure set forth in 
Paragraph l.c above. In the event of such a dispute, the USS Parties shall 
provide the Mariposa Franchisees with access to the CAMS Data (of the 
same type and nature set forth in Paragraph 1 above) necessary to show the 
DHL Services provided to the Mariposa Franchisees and/or their customers. 
(R. 155, 196; Settlement Agreement % 3.a) (emphases added). 
The "dispute resolution procedures" applicable to freight disputes and disputes 
concerning the Mariposa Franchisees' indemnification obligation are set forth in 
Paragraph Lc of the Settlement Agreement (R. 155,195; Settlement Agreement ^ Lc). 
That provision also requires that "any dispute" be resolved "exclusively by binding 
arbitration" and on an expedited basis. Specifically, Paragraph 1 x. provides: 
Dispute Resolution Procedure. The Parties agree that any dispute 
regarding [indemnification]6 will be fully and finally resolved exclusively 
by binding arbitration, as set forth in this provision. 
i. If USS and any Mariposa Franchisee are unable to 
resolve any dispute regarding the amount owed by a Mariposa 
Franchisee under Section 1 .a above, within ten (10) days after USS 
has delivered the Dispute Notice to such franchisee, the parties shall 
submit the matter to binding arbitration before one forensic 
accountant, who shall review the parties' documentation and 
establish the amount owed to USS, if any, on any disputed invoices. 
The accountant will be selected by USS and the Mariposa 
Franchisee within twenty (20) days following delivery of the Dispute 
Notice. 
6
 Paragraph Lc refers to "Freight Payments." However, Paragraph l.c is also 
incorporated into Paragraph 3.a for purposes of addressing disputes about the 
indemnification. 
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ii. The Parties agree that any arbitration under this 
Paragraph 1 shall be conducted within forty (40) days following 
delivery of the Dispute Notice. 
iii. Following the entry of an arbitration award, the 
Mariposa Franchisee shall pay to USS one-third of all amounts 
determined to be owing within ten (10) days and pay the remainder 
in accordance with Paragraph 1 .b above. 
iv. The Parties agree that the prevailing party in any 
arbitration conducted pursuant to this Paragraph 1 shall be entitled to 
recover his, her or its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in 
the arbitration. The Parties agree that a party shall be deemed a 
"prevailing party" if the arbitrator determines that the disputed 
amount is closer to the amount claimed to be due by that party than 
by the other party. 
(R. 156, 195; Settlement Agreement f^ l.c) (emphasis added). 
4. USSL Is Held Liable in the DHL Lawsuit for All Unpaid Shipments Provided 
by DHL. 
Following the execution of the Settlement Agreement, USS and USSL continued to 
pursue the DHL litigation. (R. 156). In September 2010, DHL moved for partial 
summary judgment on its counterclaim that USSL was liable to DHL for all unpaid 
shipping amounts, including all amounts the Mariposa Franchisees had not paid. (Id). 
On October 13, 2010, the district court granted DHL's motion, ruling that USSL was 
liable to DHL for all unpaid shipping amounts for services provided to the USS franchise 
system. (R. 157, 361-362; Memorandum Decision at 6-7, also attached hereto as 
Exhibit D). The district court left the question of the amount owing to DHL for those 
services for trial. (R. 362; Memorandum Decision at 7). 
Following the district court's ruling on DHL's Motion, DHL and the USS Parties 
entered into settlement negotiations and eventually executed a settlement agreement to 
resolve the DHL Lawsuit (the "DHL Agreement"). (R. 157). During the negotiations 
leading up to that agreement, DHL insisted that any amount paid to the USS Parties be 
reduced by the amounts owing to DHL for unpaid shipments. (Id). As such, in the DHL 
Agreement, the USS Parties received payment from DHL in an amount that was offset by 
the amounts owing to DHL for unpaid shipping services, including the amounts owing 
due to the Mariposa Franchisees' failure to pay. (R. 142, 157). 
5. The USS Parties Notify the Mariposa Franchisees of the DHL Agreement, and 
the Mariposa Group Attempts to Avoid Their Indemnification Obligation and 
Arbitration. 
After entering into the DHL Agreement, the USS Parties informed the Mariposa 
o 
Franchisees of that agreement by letter dated February 16, 2011. In that letter, the USS 
Parties notified the Mariposa Franchisees of their indemnification obligation and, as they 
had previously done with the freight shipments, provided the Mariposa Franchisees with 
7
 At DHL's insistence, the DHL Agreement contains a confidentiality provision 
that requires the terms of the DHL Agreement to be maintained in confidence unless 
DHL consents to disclosure or unless disclosure is required by process of law. (R. 157). 
o 
In actuality, the Mariposa Franchisees were aware of the settlement between the 
USS Parties and DHL as early as October 18, 2010, as their counsel was present in the 
courtroom when the settlement was announced to the court in the DHL Lawsuit. (R. 
157). Counsel for the Mariposa Franchisees discussed the settlement with counsel for the 
USS Parties. (R. 807 at 26:25 to 27:1-6). Contrary to the Mariposa Group's claim, at 
that time counsel for the Mariposa Franchisees never asserted that the USS Parties had 
failed to give them notice of the settlement or access to the CAMS Data. (See R. 482). 
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the CAMS Data for each of their respective franchises, showing the amounts owing for 
unpaid DHL services. (R. 158, 369). 
On March 7, 2011, the Mariposa Franchisees responded by letter. (R. 159, 482). 
Rather than disputing the amounts showing in the CAMS Data, the Mariposa Franchisees 
merely stated they needed additional "information about the settlement," without 
specifying what information they were requesting. (R. 159, 482). As a result, on March 
9, 2011, and in a further attempt to identify whether the Mariposa Franchisees disputed 
their indemnification obligation, the USS Parties sent a second letter, providing the 
Mariposa Franchisees with information about the DHL settlement, including that "USS 
and USSL received payment in an amount that was offset by the amounts owing to DHL 
for shipping services provided to USS and its franchisees." (R. 159, 484). The USS 
Parties further reminded the Mariposa Franchisees that they had not indicated whether 
they disputed any of the amounts showing in the CAMS Data. (R. 159, 485).9 
9
 Throughout the fact section of their brief, the Mariposa Group claims that they 
were repeatedly denied a copy of the DHL Agreement. {See, e.g., Aplts.' Brief at 7, 17). 
The Mariposa Group misstates the record. Due to the confidentiality provision in the 
DHL Agreement, the USS Parties repeatedly told the Mariposa Group to subpoena a copy 
of that agreement, so that it could be released under the "legal process" exception to the 
confidentiality provision in that agreement. (R. 159). During the hearing on the Motion, 
that issue was again raised, and the district court encouraged the Mariposa Group to seek 
the document through legal process. (R. 807 at 27:1-6, 28:9-10). Despite this, the 
Mariposa Group declined to do so. It was not until the parties submitted the matter to 
arbitration that the Mariposa Group finally served a document request seeking disclosure 
of the document. In response, the USS Parties provided the Mariposa Group not only 
with a copy of the agreement, but also with copies of email correspondence exchanged 
with DHL leading up to that agreement. 
Following this exchange, a number of the Mariposa Franchisees began complying 
with their indemnification obligation under the Settlement Agreement and executed 
promissory notes, as required under Paragraph 3 of the agreement (R. 159). However, 
others continued to refuse to do so because they disputed any obligation to pay the USS 
Parties the amounts reflected in the CAMS Data. (Id). Specifically, on March 17, 2011, 
counsel for the Mariposa Franchisees sent a letter in which he stated that, unless the DHL 
Agreement had been written in a specific manner advocated by the Mariposa Franchisees, 
"there is no indemnification obligation." (R. 159-60, 487). He also stated that his clients 
objected to the amounts reflected in the CAMS Data as "inaccurate." (R. 160, 488). 
As a result of the continued refusal of certain Mariposa Franchisees to fulfill their 
indemnification obligation and in a continued effort to resolve the dispute, the USS 
Parties sent a third letter to the non-complying Mariposa Franchisees, attempting to 
resolve the dispute regarding the indemnification obligation owed to the USS Parties and 
to identify what amounts were disputed (the "June 1st Letters"). (R. 160, 490-528). In 
the June 1st Letters, the USS Parties provided the specific amount owed by each 
Mariposa Franchisee and again requested that each indicate whether that amount was 
disputed. (R. 160, 490-528). If not, the USS Parties requested that they execute 
Promissory Note # 2, as required by the Settlement Agreement. (R. 160, 490-528). If, 
however, the Mariposa Franchisee disputed the amount, the letter requested that each 
Mariposa Franchisee indicate the amount disputed, provide the basis for the dispute, and 
include any relevant documentation. (R. 160, 490-528). 
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In response, a few more of the Mariposa Franchisees fulfilled their 
indemnification obligation by executing the required promissory note, but the remaining 
group (the Mariposa Group) declined even to respond. (R. 161). As a result, on July 13, 
2011, the USS Parties served the Mariposa Group with "Dispute Notices," which, under 
Paragraphs l.c and 3 of the Settlement Agreement initiated the expedited arbitration 
proceedings set forth in Paragraph 1 .c to resolve the dispute concerning the amount 
owing to the USS Parties under the indemnification provision. (R. 161, 530-559). In 
anticipation of these Dispute Notices, and to avoid or delay the expedited arbitration 
process, on July 12, 2011, the Mariposa Group filed the Complaint in Third District 
Court. (R. 1, 161). Ten days later, the Mariposa Group sent a letter to the USS Parties' 
counsel, stating that they would not engage in arbitration or participate in the selection of 
an arbitrator as required by the Settlement Agreement. (R. 161, 561). 
In their Complaint, the Mariposa Group sought declaratory relief on four causes of 
action and an injunction through a fifth cause of action. See (R. 11-17, 161; Complaint at 
11-17). Throughout the Complaint, the Mariposa Group disputes the amounts owed, the 
accuracy of the information provided, and ultimately, their indemnification obligation 
itself (R. 11-17). 
6. The USS Parties Move to Compel Arbitration of the Parties' Dispute, and 
the District Court Grants the Motion. 
As a result of the Mariposa Group's refusal to participate in the arbitration process 
provided for in the Settlement Agreement and their filing of the Complaint, on August 1, 
2011, the USS Parties moved to compel arbitration of the parties' dispute. (R. 136). 
The Mariposa Group filed an opposition to the Motion, and the district court heard oral 
argument on the Motion on August 19,2011. (See R. 807.) At the end of the hearing, the 
district court determined that, as a matter of law, the terms of the Settlement Agreement 
required the parties to resolve their disputes in accordance with the arbitration procedure 
contained in Paragraph I.e. (R. 807 at 28:7-20). On September 6, 2011, the district court 
entered the Order, which provides: "The Motion is granted. The parties are ordered to 
arbitrate their dispute in accordance with the arbitration procedures set forth in Paragraph 
I.e. of the Settlement Agreement." (R. 703-04). 
V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This appeal is the latest in a series of attempts by the Mariposa Group since 2008 
to avoid or delay their payment obligations to the USS Parties. The facts are not in 
dispute. The parties entered into the Settlement Agreement, which contains an arbitration 
provision. Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the Settlement Agreement require the parties to 
arbitrate "any disputes" they have concerning any amounts owing to the USS Parties for 
unpaid shipments. The only question at issue is whether the district court correctly 
concluded that the parties' dispute falls within the arbitration provision of the agreement. 
The answer is clearly, yes. 
10
 Contrary to Appellants5 claim, the USS Parties moved to compel arbitration of 
the parties' disputes concerning any amounts owing under the indemnification provision 
generally. The Motion was not limited to compelling arbitration of the disputes raised in 
the Complaint as characterized by the Mariposa Group. 
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The unambiguous language of the Settlement Agreement demonstrates that, at the 
time of execution, there were only two issues the parties left to be resolved in the future 
under specified procedures: (1) the amounts owing for unpaid freight shipments under 
Paragraph 1 of the Settlement Agreement, and (2) the amount, if any, owing for DHL 
shipments under Paragraph 3 of the Settlement Agreement. The language of both 
paragraphs requires any dispute regarding those amounts to be resolved pursuant to the 
expedited arbitration procedures of Paragraph 1 .c, and not through costly and extended 
litigation (of the type they had just settled). 
The Mariposa Group attempts to avoid this conclusion by advocating for a narrow, 
hypertechnical, and convoluted interpretation of Paragraph 3—one that would limit the 
arbitration only to certain categories, and even then, only to the issue of checking the 
"accuracy" of the shipping data. The plain language of the Settlement Agreement is not 
so limited. The agreement does not make arbitration conditional; it makes it mandatory. 
Moreover, the word "accuracy" (on which the Mariposa Group pins its argument) does 
not even appear in the Settlement Agreement. 
Finally, it is clear that the dispute between the parties plainly concerns any 
amounts owing under the indemnification provision and, hence, must be arbitrated. Try 
as they might, the Mariposa Group cannot avoid the fact that the allegations of the 
Complaint (no matter how cleverly written to tiy to avoid arbitration) boil down to 
whether the Mariposa Group owes some amount to the USS Parties under the 
indemnification provision. Indeed, from February 2011 to July 2011, the parties 
exchanged numerous communications—all of which concerned whether the Mariposa 
Group owed amounts to the USS Parties under the indemnification provision and, if so, 
how much was owed. The Mariposa Group took the position that they did not owe 
anything under that provision and, if they did, the amount indicated in the CAMS Data 
was incorrect. Such positions plainly fall within the scope of "any dispute between the 
USS Parties and the Mariposa Franchisees concerning these amounts." (Settlement 
Agreement <[j 3.a). As such, pursuant to Paragraph 3.a, the dispute "shall be resolved in 
accordance with the dispute resolution procedure set forth in Paragraph I.e." Id. 
The district court saw through the Mariposa Group's attempt to avoid their 
obligation to arbitrate the parties' dispute. The district court's decision should be 
affirmed. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Correctly Enforced the Arbitration Provision and Construed 
that Provision in Favor of Arbitration. 
Because of Utah's strong policy favoring arbitration, Utah law has implemented a 
clear and expedited procedure for resolving motions to compel arbitration. Section 78B-
11-108(1) of the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act (the "UAA") provides, "[o]n motion of a 
person showing an agreement to arbitrate and alleging another person's refusal to 
arbitrate pursuant to the agreement... the court shall proceed summarily to decide the 
issue and order the parties to arbitrate unless it finds that there is no enforceable 
agreement to arbitrate." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-108(1) (2008) (emphases added); see 
also Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, \ 33, 44 P.3d 663 ("[I]f a party shows the 
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existence of an arbitration agreement, then the court shall order the parties to arbitrate." 
(internal quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted)). 
In interpreting this section, the Utah Supreme Court has held that "[wjhere the 
evidence relating to a purported agreement to arbitrate is undisputed, the district court has 
no discretion under the statute. It must compel arbitration." McCoy v. Blue Cross & 
Blue Shield of Utah, 2001 UT 31,110, 20 P.3d 901.n Moreover, section 78B-1M08(4) 
of the UAA makes clear that "[t]he court may not refuse to order arbitration" even where 
"the claim subject to arbitration lacks merit or grounds for the claim have not been 
established." Further, consistent with Utah's policy encouraging arbitration, courts are to 
interpret the scope of arbitration provisions broadly and in favor of arbitration: 
[I]f there is any question as to whether the parties agreed to resolve their 
disputes through arbitration or litigation,... we interpret the agreement 
keeping in mind our policy of encouraging arbitration. "It is the policy of 
the law in Utah to interpret contracts in favor of arbitration, 'in keeping 
with our policy of encouraging extrajudicial resolution of disputes when the 
parties have agreed not to litigate.'" 
Cent. Fla., 2002 UT 3, ^ f 16 (citations omitted; emphasis added).12 
In this case, it is undisputed that the Settlement Agreement contains an agreement 
to arbitrate. The Mariposa Group does not dispute that the arbitration provision is valid 
11
 Section 78B-11-108 was previously codified as Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-49. 
12
 See also Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 
1992) (stating "this court has also recognized the strong public policy in favor of 
arbitration 'as an approved, practical, and inexpensive means of settling disputes and 
easing court congestion'" (footnote omitted)); Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady Sys., 
Inc., 731 P.2d 475,479 (Utah 1986) ("It is our policy to interpret arbitration clauses in a 
manner that favors arbitration."). 
and binding. The only question presented by the Mariposa Group's appeal is whether the 
district court correctly concluded that the dispute between the parties falls within the 
scope of the arbitration provision. A plain reading of the Settlement Agreement confirms 
that it did. 
B. The Settlement Agreement Requires the Parties to Arbitrate "Any Dispute" 
Concerning Amounts Owed Under the Indemnification Provision. 
The heart of the dispute between the parties is whether the Mariposa Group is 
obligated to indemnify the USS Parties for the amounts the USS Parties had to pay to 
DHL for unpaid DHL shipments and, if so, what amount they owe. Throughout 2011, 
the Mariposa Group repeatedly took the position that they owed nothing under the 
indemnification provision or, if they did, they did not owe the amount claimed by the 
USS Parties. (R. 487-88, 561-62). The USS Parties disputed that position. The 
unambiguous language of the Settlement Agreement shows that the parties agreed that 
this dispute would be resolved through arbitration. 
Whether a motion to compel arbitration was properly granted is, in the first 
instance, "a matter of contract interpretation" to "determine whether the parties bargained 
for arbitration as a method of resolving their disagreements.5' Cent. Fla., 2002 UT 3, 
Tf 10. As such, the court looks to the "four corners of the agreement to determine the 
intentions of the parties." Id. \ 12 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If the 
language is unambiguous, "the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning 
of the contractual language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law." Id. 
In interpreting the arbitration agreement, the court "attempts] to harmonize all of the 
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contract's provisions and all of its terms." Id. Moreover, as already noted, the court must 
construe the contract in favor of arbitration. Id. f 16.13 Here, the terms of the Settlement 
Agreement are unambiguous and show that the parties bargained to have disputes like the 
one between the parties resolved exclusively through arbitration. 
The language of the Settlement Agreement is not ambiguous. In the agreement, 
the parties resolved all disputes between them, except for two issues they left to be 
resolved at a future date: (1) the amount USS was owed for unpaid freight (to be 
determined after the CAMS Data had been exchanged), and (2) the amount the USS 
Parties were determined to owe to DHL for unpaid DHL shipments provided to the 
Mariposa Franchisees or their customers, if any (regardless of whether that amount was 
established through settlement or judgment), which was to be determined once the DHL 
Lawsuit had been concluded. With respect to both of these issues, the parties made clear 
that "any dispute" would be resolved exclusively through the binding arbitration 
procedure of Paragraph I.e. {See Settlement Agreement ffl[ I.e. & 3.a). In particular, as it 
relates to the indemnification provision of Paragraph 3, the agreement provides as 
follows: 
3. Indemnification by the Mariposa Franchisees for DHL 
Services. By entering into this Agreement, the respective Mariposa 
Franchisees agree to indemnify and hold USS harmless for any and all 
amounts the USS Parties are determined to owe DHL through judgment or 
settlement for DHL services provided to the respective Mariposa 
See also Docutel Olivetti, 731 P.2d at 479 ("It is our policy to interpret 
arbitration clauses in a manner that favors arbitration."). 
Franchisees and/or their customers and which the respective Mariposa 
Franchisees or their customers have not already paid to USS or DHL 
{regardless of whether that determination is by judgment or through 
settlement, and regardless of whether the amount is determined through set-
off amounts that may reduce any judgment in favor of the USS Parties and 
against DHL) 
(Settlement Agreement \ 3) (emphases added). The very next paragraph, Subparagraph 
3.a (which specifically addresses the amount of the indemnification obligation set forth in 
Paragraph 3), states that, if "any dispute" arises between the parties concerning any 
amounts at issue, that dispute is a matter for arbitration: 
a. The Parties agree that, if DHL and the USS Parties desire to 
resolve the DHL Lawsuit through a settlement, the USS Parties shall 
provide the Mariposa Franchisees with access to the CAMS Data (of the 
same type and nature set forth in Paragraph 1 above) necessary to show the 
DHL Services provided to the Mariposa Franchisees and/or their customers. 
If the Mariposa Franchisees do not agree with the amount identified by the 
USS Parties, the USS Parties shall nevertheless have the right to proceed 
with the settlement and any dispute between the USS Parties and the 
Mariposa Franchisees concerning these amounts shall be resolved in 
accordance with the dispute resolution procedure [(arbitration)] set forth 
in Paragraph he. above. Likewise, if the USS Parties are determined to 
owe DHL, through a judgment, any amount for services provided to the 
Mariposa Franchisees and/or their customers, any dispute between the USS 
Parties and the Mariposa Franchisees concerning such amounts shall be 
resolvefdj in accordance with the dispute resolution procedure 
[(arbitration)] set forth in Paragraph he above. .. } 
Paragraph l.c of the Settlement Agreement provides, in part: 
Dispute Resolution Procedure. The Parties agree that any dispute 
regarding the [indemnification obligation] will be fully and finally resolved 
exclusively by binding arbitration, as set forth in this provision. 
i. If USS and any Mariposa Franchisee are unable to resolve 
any dispute regarding the amount owed by a Mariposa Franchisee . . . 
within ten (10) days after USS has delivered the Dispute Notice to such 
(continued . . .) 
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Id. f 3.a (emphases added). 
Interpreting paragraphs 3, 3.a and I.e. together plainly shows that the parties 
wanted to avoid further extended litigation and intended to arbitrate, on an expected 
basis, "any dispute" concerning the amounts the USS Parties claimed to be owed under 
the indemnification provision, regardless of whether that dispute arose out of a settlement 
between the USS Parties and DHL or a judgment in the DHL Lawsuit. The use of the 
words "any dispute," denotes that the parties intended all disputes regarding the 
amounts—whether the dispute centered on a discrepancy in the numbers or in the basic 
question of whether Mariposa Franchisees owed anything at all—to be resolved by 
arbitration. (R. 807 at 26:12-18). 
C. The Mariposa Group's Narrow, Hypertechnical Interpretation Is not 
Consistent with the Settlement Agreement and Is Unreasonable. 
In their attempt to escape arbitration, the Mariposa Group advocates a narrow, 
hypertechnical, and unreasonable interpretation of Paragraph 3.a of the Settlement 
Agreement. To do so, they manufacture imaginary limitations and conditions that are not 
present in the agreement. Their interpretation does not comport with Utah law, does not 
(... continued) 
franchisee, the parties shall submit the matter to binding arbitration before 
one forensic accountant, who shall review the parties' documentation and 
establish the amount owed to USS, if any, on any disputed invoices. 
Settlement Agreement \ l.c (emphases added). 
follow the requirement that arbitration provisions should be construed broadly in favor of 
arbitration, and should be rejected. 
The Mariposa Group argues that the Settlement Agreement provides only three 
limited categories of disputes that the parties intended to be subject to arbitration. The 
first category they argue derives from Paragraphs l.a & b of the Settlement Agreement 
and pertains only to freight disputes. (See Aplts.' Brief at 11-12). The second category 
of disputes they claim are subject to arbitration arises out of the last sentence of 
Paragraph 3.a, and, according to them, pertains only where a dispute arises after a 
judgment has been entered in the DHL Lawsuit. (Id. at 14-15). As no final judgment 
was entered in that case, the Mariposa Group claims this category is inapplicable. (Id.) 
Finally, the Mariposa Group asserts that the third category of arbitrable disputes comes 
out of Paragraph 3.a, but claims such disputes are only arbitrable if the USS Parties want 
to settle with DHL and if the USS Parties satisfy "certain specific" preconditions. (See 
id. at 14-15).15 If the USS Parties failed to satisfy any of those conditions, they claim the 
USS Parties "forfeited] any right to arbitration." (Id. at 14). The Mariposa Group claims 
that, because the USS Parties did not satisfy each of these conditions precedent prior to 
settling with DHL, the USS Parties lost their right to submit the dispute to arbitration. 
15
 Specifically, the Mariposa Group identifies these "certain specific" conditions to 
consist of the following four steps: (1) "USS must desire to resolve the DHL Lawsuit 
through settlement"; (2) "USS must provide the Mariposa Franchisees with CAMS Data 
before entering into a settlement with DHL"; (3) "the Mariposa Franchisees must 
disagree with the amounts identified by USS through the CAMS Data"; (4) "USS must 
proceed with settlement." (Aplts.' Brief at 13). 
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{Id.) The Mariposa Group's interpretation finds no support in the Settlement Agreement, 
ignores the obvious breadth of the words "any disputes/' and is unreasonable. 
As already noted, Paragraph 3.a provides that "any dispute" concerning the 
amounts identified by the USS Parties must be resolved through arbitration. This 
language, particularly when read in light of Utah law that requires arbitration provisions 
to be construed broadly and in favor of arbitration, see Cent Fla., 2002 UT 3, f 16, 
denotes that all disputes relating in any way to any amounts alleged to be owing fall 
within the arbitration requirement.16 Not only would the Mariposa Group's interpretation 
require a court to sidestep the words "any dispute" and applicable Utah law, the 
preconditions they seek to impose are unsupported by the language of the agreement. 
Paragraph 3.a does not state that, if the USS Parties do not inform the Mariposa Group of 
the settlement or provide the CAMS Data before a settlement, they forfeit their right to 
16
 The Mariposa Group cites to Bybee v. Abdulla, 2008 UT 35, ^ 26, 189 P.3d 40, 
and Ellsworth v. American Arbitration Ass % 2006 UT 77, ^ 14, 148 P.3d 983, for the 
proposition that the "'presumption in favor of arbitration . . . applies only when 
arbitration is a bargained-for remedy of the parties as evidenced by direct and specific 
evidence of a contract to arbitrate.'" (Aplts.' Brief at 10 (quoting Bybee, 2008 UT App % 
26) Their reliance on these cases is misplaced. Those cases addressed whether there was 
any agreement to arbitrate in the first instance given the lack of direct and specific 
evidence. See Bybee, 2008 UT 35, f 34 (holding arbitration agreement cannot bind a 
nonsignatory spouse bringing a wrongful death claim); Ellsworth, 2006 UT 77, ^ f 18 
(holding that arbitration agreement with a person's name but no signature is not direct 
and specific evidence of an agreement to arbitrate). In contrast, in this case, there is no 
dispute that an agreement to arbitrate exists. Hence, the presumption in favor of 
arbitration unquestionably applies. 
arbitration. Indeed, there is no mention anywhere in the agreement that the arbitration 
requirement is ever to be disregarded. Moreover, Paragraphs 1 and 3 do not contain any 
language that would indicate that disputes are to be resolved in a manner other than 
through arbitration. 
Adding to the problems with the Mariposa Group's interpretation is the fact that 
their alleged preconditions to arbitrability do not move this dispute away from arbitration. 
Rather, they require it. After all, the UAA provides that, while a court may decide 
"whether an agreement to arbitrate exists or a controversy is subject to an agreement to 
arbitrate": 
An arbitrator shall decide whether a condition precedent to arbitrability 
has been fulfilled and whether a contract containing a valid agreement to 
arbitrate is enforceable. 
The Mariposa Group has lost any right to argue that the USS Parties waived or 
forfeited the right to arbitrate as they did not raise that issue with the district court and did 
not preserve it for appeal. See In re Adoption of Baby E.Z., 2011 UT 38, ^ f 25, 266 P.3d 
702; see also Anderson v. Thompson, 2008 UT App 3, f 38, 176 P.3d 464 ("Because 
[appellant] raises his waiver argument for the first time on appeal, and has failed to cite 
where in the record his argument is preserved, we refuse to address the merits of this 
claim.5'). 
The Mariposa Group claims the parties must have intended to narrowly limit 
arbitration to the categories they advocate because Paragraph 5 of the Settlement 
Agreement states that, in the event of a default by a Mariposa Franchisee, the USS Parties 
"may commence an action against him, her or it in Third Judicial District of Utah, file the 
Verified Confession of Judgment, and recover for any amount still owing to the USS 
Parties " (Aplts.' Brief at 15). This argument ignores the purpose of Paragraph 5. 
That paragraph addresses only the USS Parties' right to enforce the security provided by 
the Mariposa Franchisees—i.e., the verified confessions of judgment—by filing those 
confessions of judgment with the court to obtain a judgment by confession. Only a court 
can enter a judgment by confession. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-107(2) & (3) (emphases added). By arguing that Paragraph 
3.a imposes conditions precedent to arbitrability, the Mariposa Group renders this dispute 
all the more a dispute for an arbitrator, not a court. 
Similarly, there is no merit to the Mariposa Group's contention that the only 
disputes that are arbitrable under Paragraph 3.a are those that relate to the "accuracy" of 
the amounts identified in the CAMS Data. (See Aplts.' Brief at 16). Notably, this 
argument, by its very nature, is flawed because it would require the court to read into the 
contract a term that is not there. The word "accuracy" does not appear in Paragraph 3.a 
or, for that matter, any paragraph of the Settlement Agreement Rather, the language 
provides that, if there is "any dispute . . . concerning [indemnification] amounts," it "shall 
be resolved in accordance with the dispute resolution procedure set forth in Paragraph 
I.e. above." (Settlement Agreement^ 3.a). 
Finally, the Mariposa Group's interpretation should be rejected because it is 
unreasonable and would result in nonsensical outcomes. See Olympus Hills Shopping 
Ctr., Ltd v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 458 n.16 ("[Cjourts should 
avoid [an] unreasonable interpretation when [a] contract provision would be reduced to 
absurdity . . . . " ) ; McNeil Eng'g & Land Surveying, LLC v. Bennett, 2011 UT App 423, t 
17, 268 P.3d 854 ("'[A]n interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective 
meaning to all the terms is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part 
unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect.'" (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 
203(a) (1981))). 
For example, under the Mariposa Group's interpretation of Paragraph 3.a, if the 
USS Parties had provided the CAMS Data prior to the settlement, any disputes regarding 
the amounts owing would have to be resolved through arbitration. If, however, the USS 
Parties provided the CAMS Data after settling with DHL, the parties would be required 
to resolve their dispute through court proceedings, even though the dispute may be about 
the very same issue and even though the USS Parties retained the unfettered right under 
Paragraph 3.a to settle the case with DHL irrespective of the Mariposa Franchisees' 
reaction to the settlement. The Mariposa Group offers no explanation for why the parties 
would have intended such an irrational result. 
Moreover, if the Mariposa Group's interpretation were correct, the three categories 
of disputes they identify would have to be arbitrated, but all other disputes would have to 
be resolved in different tribunals, even if those disputes were all related to or arose out of 
the same set of circumstances as the matters being arbitrated. This would inevitably 
result in the need to resolve disputes piecemeal with the potential for overlapping and 
inconsistent rulings. The very same result would occur if only disputes regarding the 
"accuracy" of the CAMS Data were arbitrable. Using this case as an example, under the 
« 
Mariposa Group's theory, the parties would first have to take their case to court to resolve 
all disputes other than the accuracy of the CAMS Data. Then, if the USS Parties 
prevailed in establishing a right to be indemnified, the USS Parties would have to file a 
separate arbitration to resolve the disputes regarding the accuracy of the CAMS Data. 
Again, there is no indication that the parties intended such a result, and such an outcome 
is clearly not consistent with the parties' intent to arbitrate disputes and avoid litigation. 
Simply put, by using the words "any dispute," the parties intended all disputes 
concerning any amount owing under Paragraph 3 to be arbitrated. The Mariposa Group's 
interpretation is not consistent with the terms of the agreement, is contrary to Utah law, 
and is unreasonable. 
D. The Parties Dispute Falls Within the Scope of "Any Disputes" Under 
Paragraph 3 of the Settlement Agreement. 
In a final effort to avoid arbitration, the Mariposa Group argues that the district 
court erred in granting the Motion because the "causes of action alleged in the 
Complaint" fall outside of the intended scope of the arbitration provision. (Aplts.' Brief 
at 17-18). This argument, like the Mariposa Group's other arguments, too narrowly 
construes the nature of the parties' dispute and inaccurately portrays the Complaint. The 
parties' dispute, including the claims in the Complaint, all center on the question of the 
amount, if any, that the Mariposa Group owes the USS Parties under Paragraph 3. As 
such, the dispute is subject to the arbitration provision. 
As an initial matter, the Mariposa Group's argument regarding the nature of the 
parties' dispute is flawed because it is based on the assumption that the parties' dispute is 
defined only by the contents of the Mariposa Group's Complaint. That assumption is 
incorrect. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-108 (the provision governing motions to compel 
arbitration) allows a party to compel arbitration of any issue that is subject to arbitration, 
not only issues that were improperly filed in court through a complaint. 
In this case, and after nearly six months of the Mariposa Group challenging that 
they owed the amounts identified by the USS Parties and refusing to sign promissory 
notes in those amounts, the USS Parties sent out "Dispute Notices" triggering an 
arbitration to resolve the dispute. (R. 161, 530-559). It was only in July 2011, and after 
that dispute had ripened, that the Mariposa Group filed the Complaint. (R. 1). Even 
then, the Complaint was an obvious effort by the Mariposa Group to avoid the arbitration 
by attempting to re-characterize the nature of the parties9 dispute. The district court saw 
through the Mariposa Group's effort, concluded that the parties' dispute fell within the 
scope of the arbitration provision, and ordered the parties to resolve their dispute through 
arbitration. (R. 807 at 28:7-20). In doing so, the district court did not base its ruling only 
on the content of the Complaint. (R. 703-04; 807 at 11:16-19). 
Even setting aside the parties' larger dispute, the Mariposa Group's contention that 
the claims in the Complaint do not fall within the scope of the arbitration provision 
misrepresents the Complaint. As set forth above, Paragraph 3.a makes clear that, 
pursuant to Paragraph l.c, the arbitrator shall hear "any dispute between the USS Parties 
and the Mariposa Franchisees concerning [the] amounts [identified by the USS 
Parties]...." Settlement Agreement f^ 3.a (emphasis added); see also id ^ l.c ("The 
Parties agree that any dispute ... will be fully and finally resolved exclusively by 
binding arbitration, as set forth in this provision") (emphasis added). Certainly then, "any 
dispute" would include a dispute concerning the accuracy of the CAMS Data, but also 
any claim by the Mariposa Group that they cannot tell what they owe or a claim that they 
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only owe a certain percentage of what is being sought or that they owe nothing at all. 
Each of the claims in the Complaint are subsumed within these issues and are a subset of 
the larger question of the amount, if any, owed to the USS Parties under Paragraph 3 of 
the Settlement Agreement. 
For example, the Mariposa Group's First cause of action contains the following 
statement: "Accordingly, the dispute over the amounts owed under Paragraph 3 of the 
Settlement Agreement has sharpened into an imminent clash of legal rights and 
obligations between Plaintiffs and USS." (R. 12; Compl. f^ 82) (emphasis added). 
Likewise, their second cause of action states, "Plaintiffs have clearly informed USS that 
they have not received sufficient information to determine the amounts they owe and that 
they • . . dispute the amounts contained in the CAMS database." (R. 13; Compl. f^ 89 
(emphasis added). 
Similarly, in their third cause of action, the Mariposa Group disputes the amounts 
the USS Parties allege to be owing because they claim that "the CAMS database had not 
been updated to reflect the actual amount of the alleged offset," (R. 14, Compl. f^ 96; "the 
CAMS database contains errors," (R. 14; Compl. ^ 99); and USS failed to provide 
Plaintiffs with any determination of the amounts owed to DHL for the Mariposa 
Franchisees unpaid shipments. (R. 14; Compl. f 97).19 Finally, in their fourth cause of 
In addition, Paragraph 60 of the Complaint alleges that the Mariposa Group 
disputes the amounts reflected in the CAMS Data provided by the USS Parties: "When 
Plaintiffs accessed the CAMS database, they realized that it contained errors with respect 
(continued...) 
action, the Mariposa Group seeks a declaration that they "are not in default of the 
Settlement Agreement" by failing to sign the promissory note in the amounts identified 
by the USS Parties. (R. 16; Compl. *§ 114). All of these matters center on what is owed, 
if anything, to the USS Parties under Paragraph 3 and are, therefore, subject to mandatory 
arbitration. 
The Mariposa Group fails to show how these claims fall outside of the arbitration 
provision. While they feign that their claims were to obtain the DHL Agreement and, as 
such, were not about the amount they owe, that contention is disingenuous. (See Aplts.' 
Brief at 17-18.) Prior to filing of the Complaint and then at oral argument, counsel for 
the USS Parties (and the district court also) suggested to the Mariposa Group's counsel 
that he subpoena the document. (See R. 807 at 26:20 to 27:6, 28:9-10). For whatever 
reason, he chose not to do so. When the parties proceeded to arbitration, the Mariposa 
Group received the DHL Settlement Agreement and related documents in response to a 
discovery request. Moreover, as the district court recognized, any claims related to 
obtaining the DHL Agreement were part and parcel of the larger question of what is 
owed under Paragraph 3 of the agreement and could be addressed by the arbitrator. (R. 
807 at 24:16-17, 27:7-12, 28:3-13). 
(... continued) 
to royalties due to USS and adjustments credited to Plaintiffs for 'Problem Shipments 
...." (R. 9; Compl. at 9). 
Given this, were this case remanded to the district court, any claims related to 
obtaining the DHL Agreement would be moot. 
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Finally, the nature of the Mariposa Group's claim cannot be determined only by 
looking at the way the Mariposa Group pled their claims or by their own allegations. If 
this were not the case, a party could merely avoid arbitration by creatively pleading 
claims so that they would appear to be beyond the scope of the arbitration provision. 
Claims should be assessed as they really are. The Utah Supreme Court confirmed as 
much in the Central Florida Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest Associates case. 
In that case, the parties had agreed to an arbitration provision that required that 
"[a]ny disagreement over the terms of this agreement shall be arbitrated . . . ." 2002 UT 
3, % 4. After the plaintiff had filed claims for breach of contract, breach of the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, and specific performance, it attempted to avoid arbitration 
by claiming that the dispute did not fall within the arbitration provision "because it [was] 
a dispute over the enforcement of the agreement, as opposed to a dispute over the terms 
of the agreement." Id. \ 17. The Supreme Court rejected this argument. In doing so, it 
stated: 
In this instance, to distinguish between the terms themselves and 
enforcement of the terms would be meaningless—a distinction without a 
difference. 
To interpret the agreement in this way would, in effect, nullify the 
agreement to arbitrate. Put otherwise, an agreement to arbitrate only terms 
of an agreement is of no effect if the parties can simply bring suit to enforce 
their interpretation of the terms of the agreement.... The language of the 
addendum indicates an intent to arbitrate. If the exception advocated by 
[the plaintiff]... were permitted, it would swallow the bargain that "any 
disagreement over the terms of this agreement shall be arbitrated." 
Moreover, [the plaintiffs] proposed interpretation would be contrary to the 
parties' intent, apparent from the four corners of the agreement, to avoid 
litigation and resolve any disputes through arbitration. 
Id 1fll 17-18 (footnote omitted). 
The same is true here. The Mariposa Group attempts to interpret the Settlement 
Agreement and their Complaint in such a way as to nullify the agreement to arbitrate. 
Despite the parties' clear intent, as expressed in the four corners of the document, that 
"any dispute" concerning the amounts owing under Paragraph 3 would be resolved 
through arbitration, the Mariposa Group advocates an interpretation that so narrowly 
construes that provision as to render it of no effect and to "swallow the bargain." Id. f 
18. The district court agreed. It found the Mariposa Group's arguments unconvincing. 
In reading the arbitration provisions of the Settlement Agreement, the district court held 
that the language is "broad enough" and requires the parties "to engage in arbitration" to 
resolve the disputes between the parties. (R. 807 at 28:7-9,11-13,18-20). The USS 
Parties respectfully request this Court do likewise and affirm the district court's decision 
ordering the parties to engage in mandatory arbitration. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the district court's Order 
granting the Motion to Compel Arbitration. 
DATED this 2nd day of April 2012. 
David J. Jordan 
Cameron L. Sabin 
Joseph W. Loosle 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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Utah 
Code 
-zzzr Judicial Code 
/ O P 
1 , ^— Utah Uniform Arbitration Act 
1 0 7 Validity of agreement to arbitrate. 
78B-11-107. Validity of agreement to arbitrate. 
(1) An agreement contained in a record to submit to arbitration any existing or subsequent controversy arising 
between the parties to the agreement is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable except upon a ground that exists at law 
or in equity for the revocation of a contract. 
(2) The court shall decide whether an agreement to arbitrate exists or a controversy is subject to an agreement 
to arbitrate. 
(3) An arbitrator shall decide whether a condition precedent to arbitrability has been fulfilled and whether a 
contract containing a valid agreement to arbitrate is enforceable. 
(4) If a party to a judicial proceeding challenges the existence of, or claims that a controversy is not subject to, 
an agreement to arbitrate, the arbitration proceeding may continue pending final resolution of the issue by the 
court, unless the court otherwise orders. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 78B11_010700.ZIP L965 Bytes 
« Previous Section (78B-11-106) Next Section (78B-11-108) » 
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Utah 
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1 -
 p
 Utah Uniform Arbitration Act 
.
 0 8 Motion to compel arbitration. 
78B-11-108. Motion to compel arbitration. 
(1) On motion of a person showing an agreement to arbitrate and alleging another person's refusal to arbitrate 
pursuant to the agreement: 
(a) if the refusing party does not appear or does not oppose the motion, the court shall order the parties to 
arbitrate; and 
(b) if the refusing party opposes the motion, the court shall proceed summarily to decide the issue and order 
the parties to arbitrate unless it finds that there is no enforceable agreement to arbitrate. 
(2) On motion of a person alleging that an arbitration proceeding has been initiated or threatened but that there 
is no agreement to arbitrate, the court shall proceed summarily to decide the issue. If the court finds that there is 
an enforceable agreement to arbitrate, it shall order the parties to arbitrate. 
(3) If the court finds that there is no enforceable agreement, it may not, pursuant to Subsection (1) or (2), order 
the parties to arbitrate. 
(4) The court may not refuse to order arbitration because the claim subject to arbitration lacks merit or grounds 
for the claim have not been established. 
(5) If a proceeding involving a claim referable to arbitration under an alleged agreement to arbitrate is pending 
in court, a motion under this section must be made in that court. Otherwise a motion under this section may be 
made in any court as provided in Section 78B-11-128. 
(6) If a party makes a motion to the court to order arbitration, the court on just terms shall stay any judicial 
proceeding that involves a claim alleged to be subject to the arbitration until the court renders a final decision 
under this section. 
(7) If the court orders arbitration, the court on just terms shall stay any judicial proceeding that involves a 
claim subject to the arbitration. If a claim subject to the arbitration is severable, the court may limit the stay to 
that claim. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3,2008 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 78B11_Q10800.ZIP 2,432 Bytes 
« Previous Section (78B-11-107) Next Section (78B-11-109) » 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE CITY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
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INVESTMENTS NO. 1, COLD ) 
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UNITED SHIPPING SOLUTIONS, 
LLC, USS LOGISTICS, LLC, 
ROBERT ROSS, CHARLES DERR 
and JESSE MOORE, 
Defendants. 
-oOo-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 19th day of August, 
2011, commencing at the hour of 1:38 p.m., the above-entitled 
matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE WILLIAM W. 
BARRETT, sitting as Judge in the above-named Court for the 
purpose of this cause, and that the following proceedings were 
had. 
-oOo-
A P P E A R A N C E S 
KARTHIK NADESAN 
Attorney at Law 
Nadesan Beck 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DAVID J. JORDAN 
JOSEPH W. LOOSLE 
Attorneys at Law 
Stoel, Rives 
201 South Main Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
For the Plaintiffs: 
For the Defendants 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 
3 . (Transcriber's Note: Speaker identification 
4 a 
5 may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
6 
7 THE COURT: Be right with you. 
8 Okay. This is Mariposa Express, Inc. and others vs. 
9 United Shipping Solutions, LLC and others. 
10 May I have appearances, please? 
11 MR. NADESAN: Karthik Nadesan on behalf of the 
12 plaintiffs, Mari--wefll just call them the Mariposa group. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. 
14 MR. JORDAN: David Jordan and Joe Loosle of Stoel 
15 Rives on behalf of USS. 
16 THE COURT: It's your motion. 
17 MR. NADESAN: Actually, your Honor, i t f s — 
18 MR. JORDAN: My motion. 
19 MR. NADESAN: —their motion. 
20 THE COURT: Your motion. Thatfs right. Ifm sorry, 
21 Mr. Jordan, are you going to argue this? 
22 MR. JORDAN: I am. Thank you, your Honor. 
23 A little procedural history may be helpful to the 
24 Court here. This case arises out of to different pieces of 
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1 shipping services through a DHL and they conducted their 
2 business through a franchise system. USS contracted with 
3 franchisees who had territories throughout the United. States 
4 and within their territories, they had the authority to re-
5 sell at wholesale rates the shipping services of DHL. 
6 There came a time in 2008 when DHL decided that it 
7 was going to get out of the domestic shipping business in the 
8 United States. In doing so, they breached their contractual 
9 obligations to USS and its franchise organization. That 
10 spawned litigation in which USS was the plaintiff suing for 
11 breach of contract and other claims based on DHL's unilateral 
12 decision to exit the market. 
13 At the same time, when DHL pulle^d out of the 
14 domestic market, certain franchisees of USS made the 
15 unilateral decision to stop paying their bills, although they 
16 continued to sell and use DHL shipping services for a period 
17 of time. So there was a window within which the plaintiffs1 
18 clients were selling DHL services and--and DHL was shipping 
19 for those franchisees, for their customers and those 
20 franchisees were not paying for those shipping services. 
21 That resulted in litigation between USS and certain of its 
22 franchisees. 
23 Those two cases give rise to this litigation in the 
24 following way: In the USS franchisees litigation, which was 
25 before Judge Toomey, a TRO was entered against the franchisees P 
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1 which the franchisees violated, Judge Toomey entered an order 
2 to show cause why they shouldn't be held in contempt. Before 
3 that order to show cause was fully heard and sanctions were 
4 granted on the contempt ruling, USS and its franchisees 
5 entered into a settlement agreement. That settlement 
6 agreement has the arbitration clause, which is the subject of 
7 today's motion. 
8 ^ That arbitration clause is part of a larger 
9 agreement which provides in part that if DHL and the USS 
10 parties desire to resolve the DHL lawsuit through a 
11 settlement, the USS parties shall provide the Mariposa 
12 franchisees with access to the CAMS data, thatfs just the 
13 financial data showing all the shipments that all the 
14 franchisees made and all the invoices that they rendered. If 
15 the Mariposa franchisees do not agree with the amount 
16 identified by the USS parties, the USS parties shall have the 
17 right to proceed with the settlement and any dispute between 
18 the USS parties and the Mariposa franchisees concerning these 
19 amounts shall be resolved in accordance with the dispute 
20 resolution procedure set forth in Paragraph 1(C) above. 
21 Paragraph 1(C) above is a comprehensive arbitration clause 
22 that say any dispute between the parties has to be submitted 
23 to a single arbitrator or arbitration within certain time 
24 limits• 
25 There's another important section of this same 
DepomaxMerit Litigation 
801-328-1188 
August 19, 2011 Mariposa Express, Inc. v. United Shipping Solutions 
Defendants' Motion to Compel Mandatory Arbitration 
Page 6 
1 paragraph and it says, likewise, if the USS parties are 
2 determined to owe DHL through a judgment any amount for 
3 services provided to the Mariposa franchisees or their 
4 customers, any dispute between the USS parties and the 
5 Mariposa franchisees concerning such amounts shall be resolved 
6 in accordance with the dispute resolution paragraph set forth 
7 in Paragraph 1(C) above. Both referring back to 1(C) which is 
8 the general alternative dispute resolution arbitration clause 
9 in the agreement. 
10 Well, a little bit more history,. After the Mariposa 
11 franchisees and USS had entered into the settlement agreement 
12 containing this dispute resolution language, DHL and USS 
13 proceeded down the road with the litigation in their case, 
14 which was--which was then pending. 
15 What ultimately happened in that case is a little 
16 bit of judgment and a little bit of settlement. There was a 
17 summary judgment motion filed by DHL on its counterclaim and 
18 DHL!s counterclaim said, your franchisees have continued to 
19 ship and they have incurred charges for which they haven't 
20 paid and you owe us for all of those shipments that we've 
21 made—DHL speaking—and for which we havenft been paid. 
22 Judge Maughan heard that case and Judge Maughan 
23 entered a memorandum decision granting summary judgment in 
24 DHL's favor. I'll just read to the Court the language in his 
25 order in that regard. USS's failure in this regard, failure 
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to pay for all the charges, creates liability as a matter of | 
law in an amount to be determined at trial. DHL is therefore 1 
entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability under 1 
its--under its breach of contract counterclaim. So we were 1 
claiming various defenses to their counterclaim, Judge Barrett | 
ruled against us, we represented USS in that DHL case as well I 
and summary judgment was ordered against us saying, 1 
effectively, whatever charges you've incurred for shipments I 
that you've used and haven't paid for, you owe it. 1 
11 
Liability-- 1 
THE COURT: This is to the Mariposa— 1 
MR. JORDAN: Itfs all the franchisees, including-- fe 
THE COURT: All the franchisees. Okay. 1 
MR. JORDAN: --the—the Mariposa franchisees. 1 
They're a sub-set of the large-- 1 
THE COURT: S o — 1 
MR. JORDAN: —group of franchisees. 1 
THE COURT: Okay. So that—but no dollar amount? 1 
You1re going to go to trial. 1 
MR. JORDAN: No dollar amount was affixed, would-- .1 
that would be determined at trial. 8 
After that summary judgment was entered against us, 1 
it took one of the issues out of the case, obviously, and our 1 
claims against them then were resolved by settlement. But 1 
obviously, in that settlement negotiation, the parties had to, 1 
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1 in fact, offset what we'd already been adjudged to owe. 1 
2 * There wasn't a serious dispute between USS and DHL 1 
3 about what we owe them, a little bit of accounting 1 
4 disagreements, but we essentially knew what we'd shipped and 1 
5 hadn't paid for and so that obviously was part of the 1 
6 settlement discussion 'cause judgment had already been entered I 
7 against us that we were going to wind up owing amounts that we 1 
8 obviously couldn't dispute. 1 
9 After the settlement, we notified the Mariposa 1 
10 franchisees and the other franchisees that we had settled and 1 
11 that we had had to set off the amounts that we actually owed 1 
12 because they actually shipped and incurred expenses for which 1 
13 they actually hadn't paid. And under the settlement 1 
14 agreement, that was supposed to trigger a process by which 1 
15 they would then examine our financial data, which we call the 1 
16 CAMS data, all the invoice information, and see if they 1 
I P 
17 disagreed with us about what their individual piece of that L 
18 was. Our discussions with DHL level were at a macro level |J 
19 about total amounts owed as opposed to what is--what is any 
I1 
20 single franchisee's piece of the whole thing. jl 
21 So we provided them with CAMS data, we said, this is ! 
I r 
22 what we think you owe use, do you dispute it in any way and if t 
I N 
23 you do, then let's have the arbitration that's called for and- : 
24 -and then things would roll out from the arbitration with an 
25 amount determined specific to each franchisee, 'cause they 
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1 each have their own franchise, they each have their own 
2 business. 
3 Instead of going through arbitration with us and 
4 specifically disputing the amount that we said, this is our 
5 calculation of what you individually owe us, they filed this 
6 lawsuit. And I could speculate as to the motives, but let me 
7 just say in a very general way, I think they would like to 
8 delay the date of reckoning on what they owe us until after 
9 they have fully litigated their own third case against DHL, 
10 There is pending in the State of New York a Mariposa 
11 franchisee case against DHL in which they claim damages for 
12 DHL having pulled out of the market in violation of their 
13 contractual obligations. I think they'd like to get their 
14 money from DHL before they have to pay money out to our 
15 clients. 
16 And hence, this particular case and I think the 
17 Court will see in their briefing efforts to hyper-technically 
18 construe the arbitration clause in such a way as to say that 
19 this particular dispute, which they say they're trying to 
20 raise is somehow outside the scope of the arbitration 
21 agreement. So, that's the history that brings us here today. 
22 Just a little piece of law now that I think is 
23 helpful. In the Central Florida Investors case, which was 
24 decided by our Supreme Court in 2002, the court said this: It 
25 is the policy of the law in Utah to interpret contracts in 
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1 favor of arbitration in keeping with our policy of encouraging 
2 extra-judicial resolution of disputes when the parties have 
3 agreed not to litigate. 
4 So-, I think that sets up a presumption and the 
5 thought that if it sort of seems murky at all, we resolve 
6 those kinds of concerns in favor of arbitration. That's the 
7 policy of the State as announced by the Supreme Court. 
8 What I think is critical here is the language that I 
9 was quoting to the Court which says: I'll take it from the 
10 second part here. If the parties are determine to owe DHL, 
11 through a judgment, any amount for services provided to the 
12 Mariposa franchisees and/or their customers, any dispute 
13 between the USS parties and the Mariposa franchisees 
14 concerning such amounts shall be resolved in accordance with 
15 the dispute resolution procedure, the arbitration clause, 
16 single arbitrating within certain specified time limits. 
17 So whether you're resolving it by settlement, which 
18 is the first part of the Paragraph 3(A) of the clause or 
19 whether you're resolving it by judgment, which is th€i second 
20 part and in this case, it's both. Judgment was entered as to 
21 liability and then ultimately, settlement as to a macro amount 
22 was--was made in the case as to what would be owing under the 
23 Court's summary judgment. In €>ither case, you get back to 
24 Paragraph 1(C) and in both cases, the same language is used, 
25 which is any dispute, any dispute. 
''i™# ii*Us>g&*mln<r*>i. *^*S85S 
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1 Given the State's policy in favor of arbitration and 
2 construing doubts in favor of arbitration and presuming that 
3 arbitration should be the appropriate remedy where the parties 
4 have agreed to--agreed to arbitration, I think this is a very 
5 straightforward case, 
6 Now they--they want to raise what I consider to be 
7 hyper-technical issues about whether we should have given them 
8 data before we settled or whether they should have gotten the 
9 data after we settled or whether or not that's important. 
10 What is true is that they have all the data, all the financial 
11 data, they have our calculation of what we consider that they 
12 owe, individually, by plaintiff, and now is the time for each 
13 individual franchisee to step up and say, I think it's less 
14 than that, that's to be determined by arbitration and not by 
15 this Court. 
16 If I can answer any questions, I'd be happy to. 
17 THE COURT: No. I don't have any right now. 
18 MR. JORDAN: Thank you. 
19 THE COURT: I've looked through this stuff, though. 
20 And it's Nadesan? 
21 MR. NADESAN: Nadesan. 
22 THE COURT: I'm sorry? 
23 MR. NADESAN: Karthik Nadesan. 
24 THE COURT: Nadesan. How do you spell that? 
25 MR. NADESAN: N-a-d-e-s-a-n. 
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1 THE COURT: I've got—I'm sorry. Run that by me one 
2 more time. 
3 MR. NADESAN: N-a-d-e-s-a-n. 
4 THE COURT: N-a-d-e-s-a-n. Nadesan. Okay. 
5 Mr* Nadesan, Sorry. 
6 MR. NADESAN: Your Honor, this matter stems from 
7 something that rather troublesome about the settlement between 
8 DHL and USS. Specifically, that settlement agreement USS has 
9 represented as being confidential; however, at the same time, 
10 even in open court here today, they represent to you what the 
11 contents of that settlement agreement is. Specifically, they 
12 say under the settlement agreement, we had to pay DHL a 
13 certain amount. 
14 The problems my clients have had and have had— 
15 repeatedly requested from DHL--Ifm sorry, from USS, is some 
16 sort of substantiation of whether amount as actually paid. 
17 What was the actual exchange? Because— 
18 THE COURT: Why do you—why do you need to know 
19 that? 
20 MR. NADESAN: Because the fact is, how do we know 
21 that a payment has actually occurred? Because under the 
22 settlement agreement, it says—and let me give you a copy. Do 
23 you have a copy, your Honor? 
24 THE COURT: Yeah. I think—I think I've got two 
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MR, JORDAN: Somewhere in there. 1 
MR- NADESAN: Well, let me—let me give you one. | 
THE COURT: No. I've got it right here. 9 
MR. NADESAN: Okay. 1 
THE COURT: This is—in fact, this is what I've been 1 
looking at. Had a little blue tag right here on it. 1 
MR. NADESAN: Sure. Well, what it says under 9 
Section 3 is that by entering into the—this agreement, the | 
first sentence of that says: By entering into this agreement, 1 
the respective Mariposa— 9 
THE COURT: Are you talking Paragraph 3 or Section 1 
3? 1 
MR. NADESAN: Section 3. J 
THE COURT: Is—can you give me a page number? 1 
MR. NADESAN: Sure. It's Page 5. 1 
THE COURT: 5? 1 
MR. NADESAN: Says by entering into this agreement, I 
the respective Mariposa franchisees agree to indemnify and 1 
hold USS harmless for any and all amounts the USS parties are 1 
determined to owe DHL through judgment or settlement for DHL 6 
services provided to the respective franchisees. 1 
There—there's a little bit extending this. It says fc 
regardless of whether that determination is by judgment or 1 
through settlement and regardless of whether the amount is fi 
determined through set-off amounts that may reduce any 1 
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1 judgment in favor of the USS parties against DHL. 
2 For the Mariposa franchisees, the key issue is 
3 whether USS was determined to owe DHL, through either judgment 
4 or settlement for DHL services provided to the respective 
5 Mariposa franchisees. Now, what's clear is that there was no 
6 judgment in which the amount that they were determined to owe 
7 was entered. It's clear that -that—that the judgment issue 
8 isn't--isn't a factor here. What it is, is the amount that 
9 USS parties are determined to owe DHL through settlement for 
10 DHL services provided; however, the issue is at this point, 
11 they basically—there's a heat€*d—this is the result of—the 
12 settlement agreement is the result of a heated dispute between 
13 the parties and they basically walked up to my clients and 
14 said, well, just take our word, we paid DHL the full amount. 
15 And our clients have said, well, please provide us 
16 some sort of substantiation. And what they've said is, well, 
17 we'll get our—our accounting books; however, their accounting 
18 books don't show whether they actually made a payment to DHL 
19 or not. What their accounting books show is at the start of 
20 the DHL, their litigation with DHL, the amounts that were owed 
21 to DHL for services provided, but what it doesn't show is how 
22 much they were actually determined to owe DHL as part of their 
23 settlement agreement. 
24 And that's what this litigation is about. It's not 
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1 delay. In fact, one thing to note is that my client filed 
2 their—this complaint for declaratory judgment on July 1st and 
3 served USS on July 12th. And then on July 13th, USS sent out 
4 its arbi—demand for arbitration. 
5 In addition—they're not trying to skip out on and 
6 steal—or steal USS1 money because under the very terms of 
7 this agreement, they're not obligated to make any payments to 
8 USS until their lawsuit in New York is resolved. 
9 So the real issue that—that's arisen is, what— 
10 THE COURT: Where is that referenced in the 
11 settlement agreement? 
12 MR. NADESAN: It is on Paragraph 3, where it says--
13 it's the last sentence of Paragraph 3 before Section A. And 
14 what it says is, the parties agree that the Mariposa 
15 franchisees shall not be required to make payment to USS under 
16 this provision until such time as the franchisee lawsuit is 
17 resolved, either through a final, non-appealable judgment or 
18 against the Mariposa franchisees or through settlement. 
19 So this isn't a matter of them trying to take the 
20 money and leave town. This is a matter of them trying to make 
21 a determination of what they actually owe USS under the 
22 indemnification provision. And the problem is that USS is 
23 unwilling or unable to provide some sort of substantiation 
24 other than its bald-faced assertions. But that — the problem 
25 with that is,, how can USS, on the one hand say, we have a 
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1 confidential agreement, we can't talk about it, we can't 
2 disclose it, the other hand, saying, under this confidential 
3 agreement, we were determined to owe DHL the full amounts of 
4 all the amounts that were in our CAMS system. 
5 And so we brought this case, not to dispute the 
6 actual amounts, but to find out what is USS1 burden of proof, 
7 what must they do in order to show that there—there actually 
8 is a determination of the amount they owe under the settlement 
9 agreement. 
10 And in fact, one of the items in our complaint is 
11 for an injunction requiring them to disclose the actual 
12 settlement agreement. If the settlement agreement shows that 
13 they paid the actual amounts, then yes, if the arbitration 
14 clause is applicable, then the parties can go into arbitration 
15 and decide whether their CAMS data is correct or not; however, 
16 what the—the problem is, is that the settlement agreement 
17 doesn't contain this offset for this full amount or doesn't 
18 off—document an offset at all. 
19 For instance, if the settlement agreement doesn't 
20 mention at all the amount that USS is determined to owe DHL, 
21 then my clients would have no obligation to pay DHL anything 
22 under the settlement agreement,. If the settlement agreement 
23 says that there — that they have to pay a fifty percent offset, |j 
24 so I think DHL was asking for approximately $6 million and 
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1 owed. Now, if DHL says—will pay us $3 million in offset as 
2 part of the settlement agreement, then my clients would be 
3 only be obligated to pay fifty percent of the amounts in this 
4 CAMS database. 
5 So the issue is not one of whether the parties are 
6 fighting about what's in the CAMS database, it's at issue— 
7 it's a more—it's a larger issue than that, specifically, it's 
8 the issue of whether USS paid anything or is determined—more 
9 accurately, is determined to owe anything to DHL for services 
10 provided to my clients under the settlement agreement. 
11 Now, USS has made the case that any dispute, 
12 including the more global dispute about whether they were 
13 determined to owe anything on the settlement agreement, is 
14 covered by the arbitration clause. I don't think that's the 
15 case, Utah law favors arbitration and where there are 
16 ambiguities or there's a dispute about the meaning of the 
17 arbitration clause, it favors arbitration. However, what it 
18 also says is that it cannot — a party cannot be forced to 
19 arbitration where it hasn't agreed to it. 
20 And so we have to look at the agreement to determine 
21 what exactly the Mariposa—Mariposa group agreed to arbitrate. 
22 What they agreed to arbitrate—well, they—first of all, they 
23 agreed to arbitration under two circumstances. The first is 
24 if a judgment was entered in USS in favor of DHL. We know 
25 that that has never happened, there was never a judgment, 
. —-— ' .m*^ ^^  
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there was a settlement. 1 
Number two, it says if there is a settlement, the 1 
Mariposa franchisees—and let me read this so I'm not—not 1 
misrepresenting-- 1 
THE COURT: Where are you at? Paragraph (A)? 1 
MR. NADESAN: Paragraph 3(A). It says, if—the 1 
parties agree that if DHL and the USS parties desire to | 
resolve the DHL lawsuit through settlement, the USS parties 1 
shall provide the Mariposa franchisees with access to the CAMS 1 
data necessary to show the DHL services provided to the E 
Mariposa franchisees or their customers. If the franchisees 1 
do not agree with the amount identified by the USS parties, 1 
the USS parties shall nevertheless have the right to proceed | 
with the settlement and any dispute between the USS parties 1 
and the Mariposa franchisees concerning these amounts shall be 1 
resolved in accordance with the dispute resolution procedures 1 
set forth in Paragraph 1(C) above. I 
I 
What that says, in my understanding of it, is that | prior to a se tlement, USS will contac  Mariposa, say--the 
•i 
Mariposa franchisees, say we're going to settle this, but in ; 
order to settle it, to determine whether there's going to be 
an offset of fifty percent, whether they're paying the entire v 
amount, what the exact amount of that settlement determination > 
is going to be, we'd like to make sure you check our books and -
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1 The Mariposa franchisees then say yes, your books 
2 are correct, or they say, no, we think your books are not 
3 correct. At that point, USS goes and says, well, we're going 
4 to go settle it anyway, but we'll decide afterwards whether 
5 our books are correct or not. 
6 What this doesn't mention is what—is the issue 
7 raised on the first page of--sorry--the first sentence of 
8 Paragraph 3, which is the indemnification amount. These 
9 amounts, as it says here, that refers just to the CAMS data, 
10 not to the determination of the—of what USS owes DHL. 
11 As a result, we think that, first of all, it's 
12 entirely possible that the arbitration provision doesn't even | 
13 apply now because USS concedes that prior to entering into 
14 settlement with DHL, it never informed Mariposa of the 
15 settlement, it never provided them with the CAMS data, 
16 Mariposa never disputed that amount because it never had the 
17 opportunity to prior to that settlement. 
18 Now the settlement has happened, USS has come in and 
19 it said, well, here's the amount that we paid, it's the same 
20 as in our CAMS system, that's how much you owe us. But again, 
21 that places us in a difficult spot because we don't know 
22 whether--what the determination was as part of that settlement 
23 agreement. 
24 Now, the other issue that arises is, what 1(C) 
25 actually says. Now, 1(C), if we turn to that, your Honor, is, 
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1 first of all is 1(C), as you can read in the first sentence, 
2 was not intended to fully apply to Paragraph 3, because it 
3 starts that the parties agree that any dispute regarding the 
4 freight payments will be fully and finally resolved 
5 exclusively by binding arbitration. 
6 However, as a piece of background, the freight 
7 payments resolved—referred there are not to Paragraph 3, it's 
8 actually to Paragraph 1. If you turn to Page 2, you'll see 
9 that Paragraph 1 define what freight payments are. So, that 
10 first sentence does not apply—that first sentence of 
11 Paragraph 1(C) does not apply to Paragraph 3. Instead, what 
12 Paragraph 3 says is that the procedures in 1(C) will apply. 
13 And then I think it's important to see what those 
14 procedures are in terms of determining the extent of this 
15 arbitration procedure. And specifically what 1(C) says is, if 
16 USS and--sorry, 1(C)(1). If USS and any Mariposa franchisee 
17 are unable to resolve any dispute regarding the amount owed by 
18 a Mariposa franchisee under Section 1(A) above, the parties 
19 will--USS will deliver a dispute notice, then the parties 
20 shall submit the matter to binding arbitration before one 
21 forensic accountant who shall review the parties' 
22 documentation and establish the amount owed to USS, if any, on 
23 any disputed invoices. 
24 As a result, it's clear that this is just talking 
25 about the CAMS data. It's--it!s specifically the parties will 
''J^™}'^SSS^^^^S^&^^<^kWa**«,. *t®&m*k-•&*<>->-•-*•* tw;.«;^ ,«v£?!!8H5r?L;JJ&«$^ &SSK> 
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1 look at the CAMS data, they will see whether there are any 
2 disputed invoices in the CAMS data and then they will hand 
3 those disputed invoices to a forensic accountant and that 
4 forensic accountant will determine whether the invoices 
5 contain errors or not. And then he will render a decision., 
6 What it doesn't say is that the forensic accountant 
7 is going to make a determination or is going to make a 
8 judgment on how much the USS parties are determined to owe DHL 
9 through judgment or settlement. And that is the essence of 
10 what we've asked today. 
11 And another example of the fact that this entire, 
12 rather lengthy settlement agreement is not determined by that 
13 arbitration provision, you can look at Paragraph 6. And what 
14 Paragraph 6 is, is a default provision. And if you look at 
15 the last two sentences of Paragraph 6—sorry, Section 6. It 
16 says the Mariposa franchise—franchisees agree that upon 
17 default, they shall have no further rights to cure the default 
18 after expiration of the cure period and may only oppose the 
19 entry of judgment on the grounds that no default occurred, 
20 All other defenses and equity of law are waived. But what it 
21 says here, if you read the whole paragraph is that the 
22 Mariposa franchisees sign confessions of judgment and then USS 
23 was allowed to enter those confessions of judgment if there's 
24 a default; however, in the court system as opposed to 
25 arbitration, the Mariposa franchisees are allowed to contest 
DepomaxMerit Litigation 
801-328-1188 
August 19, 2011 Mariposa Express, Inc. v. United Shipping Solutions 
Defendants' Motion to Compel Mandatory Arbitration 
Page 22 
1 whether or not they were in default. 
2 Again, itfs another example that the parties did not 
3 expect or intend that this entire agreement was governed by 
4 arbitration laws. Instead, the only thing to be governed is 
5 whether the CAMS database numbers are correct or not. But 
6 here, what we've asked for in our first cause of action is the 
7 Court to interpret what this determined to owe DHL through 
8 settlement or judgment language means and more specifically, 
9 what USS needs to do to establish its burden of proof. 
10 Our second cause of action was whether procedures 
11 defined in 1(A) are applicable. It appears now that that is a 
12 moot issue because USS fairly concedes that 1(A) is not 
13 applicable; however, in correspondence to us, they had said 
14 that. 
15 The third cause of action is actually what we're 
16 deciding today, which is, is 1(C) applicable to the issue of 
17 determining whether—of this determination of liability or is 
18 it just for looking at the CAMS database. So we're actually 
19 deciding the burden — 
20 THE COURT: Liability? 
21 MR. NADESAN: Be — o n the — 
22 THE COURT: You mean on the indemnification? 
23 MR, NADESAN: On the indemnification. 
24 And so we're—we're doing number three today because 
25 that was our—our request in number three, is — is 1(C) 
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applicable to determining our liability under the 1 
indemnification provision or just to whether the CAMS figures 1 
are correct or not? 8 
THE COURT: Well, when you say liability, are you 1 
telling me that what you're asking the Court to find is the 1 
amount of the-- 1 
MR. NADESAN: No—well, it's either the amount— 1 
THE COURT: I mean, you can say you're liable, S 
you've agreed to indemnify. 1 
MR. NADESAN: Well, that's correct, your Honor. 1 
THE COURT: So now the question is, how much? 1 
MR. NADESAN: Exactly, your Honor. And what we're 1 
asking for is, what does USS—well, first of all, 1(C) is | 
1 
asking the Court to determine where this arbitration provision 1 
first in to the grand scheme of the agreement. Is it just | 
about the amounts in the CAMS database or is it about the 1 
entire—about the amount of the liability? 1 
Because as I've explained to you, the amount of the 1 
liability and the amount on the CAMS database can be 1 
different. The only way to find out whether they're the same 1 
is to actually have USS provide some sort of substantiation of 1 
what it was determined to owe under the settlement agreement. 1 
THE COURT: So what do you think they're asking in 1 
terms of the arbitration? § 
MR. NADESAN: They're asking for us to go into the 8 
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1 arbitration and determine the amount of liability. 
2 THE COURT: Each franchise owes; right? 
3 MR, NADESAN: They're—what they've said to us, your 
4 Honor, is that take us at our word, under the settlement 
5 agreement, we paid the amounts in the CAMS database. And so 
6 the CAMS database—the amounts in the CAMS database, you can 
7 contest whether that amount is correct or not, but that's what 
8 you owe. And what we're saying is, no, that is not what we 
9 owe under the liability provision. What we owe under the 
10 liability provision is the amount that you were determined to 
11 owe on behalf of each of individual franchisee under the 
12 settlement agreement. So, show us the settlement agreement, 
13 provide us an affidavit from DHL, provide us with some 
14 substantiation. 
15 And what we're asking the Court to d o -
le THE COURT: Well, does that not need to be part and 
17 parcel of any arbitration? 
18 MR- NADESAN: No. Because— 
19 THE COURT: Wouldn't the forensic accountant need to 
20 know that information? 
21 MR. NADESAN: No. Because—your Honor, because 
22 under this, the forensic accountant is only determining 
2 3 whether the CAMS data is accurate. 
24 And to give a little bit of background, the issue 
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1 was not accurate, that there were mistakes in—and errors in 
2 terms of the charges that USS was billing the franchisees. 
3 So the CAMS data and the analysis of the CAMS data 
4 is to analyze whether the CAMS invoices are in fact, correct, 
5 whether those amounts need to be adjusted because they1re 
6 billing errors and discrepancies and payments were not 
7 properly applied to the CAMS data. But that's separate from 
8 determining from going—thatf s a separate leap from going to 
9 the CAMS data represents the amount of the indemnification 
10 obligation, because the indemnification is tied to the 
11 settlement agreement. 
12 And if the Court does find that, then it—well, then 
13 we need to go into arbitration and then the arbi—the forensic 
14 accountant needs to look at the settlement agreement or some 
15 sort of substantiation, but what we've asked the Court to do 
16 is interpret the agreement to determine what the burden of 
17 proof on USS is to establish that—that there was a 
18 determination in the settlement that monies—amounts were 
19 owed. And what they said is, we donft need to make that 
20 determination, the CAMS data is simply enough. 
21 And that's what we're saying is outside the bounds 
22 of the arbitration. The arbitrator was not meant to interpret 
23 the contract, simply to look at documentation and determine 
24 whether the CAMS amounts are correct or not. 
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1 MR. JORDAN: Well, your Honor, maybe I can put this 
2 to rest right now, 
3 THE COURT: You could do that. 
4 MR. JORDAN: Yeah. Counsel has not accurately 
5 interpreted our position. We're certainly not saying that the 
6 arbitrator is restricted to looking at the CAMS data. We're 
7 not saying that the arbitrator can't look at the settlement 
8 agreement. We're not saying that the arbitrator can't decide 
9 how much is owed. All the questions he says that he wants to 
10 have determined, we acknowledge the arbitrator has the 
11 jurisdiction to decide. 
12 Because the--the language here is any dispute and as 
13 your—as your Honor correctly noted, it's any dispute over any 
14 amount. So if they say it's zero, that's a dispute over the 
15 amount; if they say it's fifty percent, that's a dispute over 
16 the amount. If we say it's a hundred percent, that's a 
17 dispute over the amount. That's all in front of the 
18 arbitrator. 
19 And will the arbitrator have to look at the 
20 settlement agreement? Sure. Right now, I can't voluntarily 
21 produce it. Can they subpoena it from me? Absolutely. Will 
22 I have to produce it in response to a subpoena? That's one of 
23 the ar--things the arbitrator will rule on, but I presume I 
24 will. All right? 
25 They've had their litigation going in New York. 
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I've said to them in their litigation in New York, I've said 1 
to counsel, counsel, subpoena it from me so that I--I can 1 
produce it consistent with the—with the confidentiality 1 
provision of the settlement agreement. They won't subpoena it 1 
from me, I can't imagine why not. But I-- fi 
THE COURT: I can't either. 1 
MR. JORDAN: —I'm talking about all these disputes 1 
and--and their statement to the Court that the—that the 8 
arbitrator is in some way restricted to looking at the CAMS I 
data is not consistent with Paragraph 1(C). It doesn't even 1 
mention CAMS data. & 
THE COURT: Huh-uh (negative). 1 
n 
MR. JORDAN: CAMS data is not even in Paragraph 1 
1(C). It says the parties shall submit the matter to binding 1 
arbitration before one forensic accountant who shall review 1 
the parties' documentation, whatever documentation, doesn't 1 
restrict it, they can submit whatever they want as 1 
documentation and establish the amount owed. That's it. They 1 
can submit any documentation they want, including the 1 
settlement agreement and the arbitrator will establish the 1 
amount owed, if any. That's the scope of this arbitration 1 
authority, it couldn't be broader and we agreed to submit any 1 
dispute as to any amount to the arbitrator under that clause. J 
MR. NADESAN: Your Honor? 1 
THE COURT: Uh-uh. He gets the last say. 1 
DepomaxMerit Litigation 
801-328-1188 
August 19, 2011 Mariposa Express, Inc. v. United Shipping Solutions 


























Page 28 fi 
MR. NADESAN: Okay, 1 
THE COURT: The way it works. 1 
Well, to be quite honest with everybody, I didn't 1 
read all this stuff, I flipped through it. My concern was 1 
basically this settlement agreement and that's what I was 1 
interested in. And I can—I can appreciate what the 1 
plaintiffs are saying, but I agree with you, Mr. Jordan, I 1 
think this is broad enough to allow for the kinds of 1 
information they think they need to see. I would suggest they i 
subpoena that settlement agreement so they have it. II 
And I'm going to dismiss the case without prejudice 1 
and order—order that it—that you engage in arbitration to 1 
determine the amounts owed. 1 
MR. JORDAN: If any. 1 
THE COURT: You can prepare an order to that effect. 1 
MR. JORDAN: I will. 1 
THE COURT: I don't think I need to make any 1 
findings, it's a motion to dismiss. So I think as a matter of b 
law, that's the way I see and-~and read this--this agreement ! 
u 
to engage in arbitration. 1 
MR. JORDAN: I'll prepare the order. 1 
THE COURT: Okay. fc 
MR. JORDAN: Thank you, your Honor. | 
Ji 
THE COURT: It's without prejudice so... | 
MR. JORDAN: Thank you for your time today. | 
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THE COURT: You're welcome. Thank you, 
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SALT LAKE tKPARTMEHl 
***. 
David J. Jordan (1751) 
djjordan@stoel.com 
Cameron L. Sabin (9437) 
clsabin@stoel.com 
Joseph W.Loosle (12154) 
jloosle@stoel. com 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
201 S Main Street, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)328-3131 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARIPOSA EXPRESS, INC, ET AL., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
UNITED SHIPPING SOLUTIONS, 
LLC; USS LOGISTICS, LLC; 
ROBERT ROSS; CHARLES DERR, 
and JESSE MOORE, 
Defendants. 
[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL 
MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND 
TO DISMISS OR, ALTERNATIVELY, 
STAY PROCEEDINGS PENDING 
ARBITRATION 
Civil No. 110915908 
Judge William W. Barrett 
On August 19, 2011, this matter came before the Court for hearing on Defendants' 
Motion to Compel Mandatory Arbitration and to Dismiss or, Alternatively, Stay Proceedings 
Pending Arbitration (the "Motion"), filed by United Shipping Solutions, LLC, USS Logistics, 
LLC, Robert Ross, Charles Derr, and Jesse Moore (collectively, the "USS Parties"). The USS 
Parties were represented by David J. Jordan and Joseph W. Loosle of Stoel Rives LLP. 
Plaintiffs (collectively, the "Mariposa Group,") were represented by Karthik Nadesan of 
Nadesan Beck P.C. 
70855919.1 0063437-00013 
After considering the memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties in support 
of, and in opposition to, the Motion; having listened to and considered the arguments of counsel; 
and thus, being fully advised and good cause appearing therefor, THE COURT HEREBY 
ORDERS AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The Motion is granted. The parties are ordered to arbitrate their dispute in 
accordance with the arbitration procedures set forth in Section Lc. of the Settlement Agreement. 
2. The Mariposa Group's Complaint is dismissed without prejudice. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this Y? day of , Vll/1 ,2011. 
Judge^illiam % Battetp
 t^£>-f 
Third Judicial District'G'ovS^udge' 
SAL 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of August 2011,1 caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND TO 
DISMISS OR, ALTERNATIVELY, STAY PROCEEDINGS PENDING ARBITRATION 
to the following: 
Via Email and US mail: Karthik Nadesan 
Ivan LePendu 
David Bernstein 
Nadesan Beck P.C. 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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EXHIBIT D 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
USS LOGISTICS, LLC, a Utah limited : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
liability company; UNITED SHIPPING 
SOLUTIONS, LLC, a Utah limited : CASE NO. 080926254 
liability company; HERE2THERE WEST, 
LLC, a New York limited liability : 
company; HERE2THERE EAST, LLC, a 
New York limited liability company;: 
EASTMAN-HILL ENTERPRISES, LLC, a 
Nevada limited liability company; : 
FULLERTON INDUSTRIES INC., an Ohio 
corporation; UNITED SHIPPING : 
SOLUTIONS OF SEATTLE, LLC, a 
Washington limited liability : 
company; PEARL SHIPPING SERVICES, 
L.L.C., a Louisiana limited : 
liability company; 10-12 SHIPPING 
SERVICES, L.L.C., a Louisiana : 
limited liability company; PGP 
OVERNIGHT INC., a New York 
corporation; KATANA CORPORATION, a 
California corporation, BRAUN : 
RESOURCES, INC., a California 
corporation; BRUCE CONREY, an : 
individual; IRON LOGISTICS, LLC, a 
Pennsylvania limited liability : 
company; ASTOUNDING LOGISTICS, 
INC., a Georgia corporation; : 
PORTLAND WEST SHIPPING, LLC, an 
Oregon limited.liability company; : 
DELIVERY SOLUTIONS, LLC, an Oregon 
limited liability company; GARY : 
E. SMITH, an individual; ELITE 
SHIPPING SYSTEMS, LLC, a Utah : 
limited liability company; 
EXPEDITED SHIPPING SERVICES, LLC, : 
a Nevada limited liability company; 
EXPRESS LOGISTICS, LLC, a Utah 
limited liability company; POINT TO 
POINT LOGISTICS, LLC, a California : 
limited liability company; PV 
TREE, INC,/ a California corporation; 
UNITED SHIPPING SOLUTIONS 
SACRAMENTO, a California general : 
partnership; MILE HIGH SHIPPING, 
LLC, a Colorado limited liability : 
company; THE OUTFIELD GROUP, LLC, a 
Missouri limited liability company;: 
NAV SHIPPING, LLC, a Maryland 
limited liability company; MAREN : 
EQUIPMENT LEASING, INC., a 
California corporation; AJ : 
LOGISTICS, INC., a California 
corporation; EJ CAPITAL HOLDINGS, : 
LLC, a Nevada limited liability 
company; KGHI,INC, a Michigan : 
corporation; and ELITE AIR & 





DHL EXPRESS (USA), INC., an Ohio 
corporation, : 
Defendant. : 
DHL EXPRESS (USA), INC., 
Counterclaim Plaintiff, : 
vs. 5 
USS LOGISTICS, LLC, and JOHN DOES : 
1 through 150, 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on October 4, 2010, 
in connection with the following Motions: (1) The "Franchisee's" Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment; (2) defendant DHL Express (USA), Inc.'s 
LMt 
USS LOGISTICS V. DHL EXPRESS PAGE 3 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
("DHL") Motion for Summary Judgment on its Counterclaims; (3) DHL's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' Claims; (4) Plaintiffs USS 
Logisticsr LLC ("USSL") and United Shipping Solutions, LLC's (^ United") 
Motion in Limine to Exclude Portions of Dr. Greg Hallman's Report and 
Testimony; (5) United/USSL's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of 
Damages of Defendant DHL; (6) United/USSL's Motion in Limine to Exclude 
Evidence Related to the Marioposa Lawsuit and Evidence Regarding 
Unasserted Claims; (7) United/USSL's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence 
of Certain Claims and Defenses of DHL; (8) DHL's Motion in Limine No. 1 
re: Documents Subject to the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product 
Doctrine; (9) DHL's Motion in Limine No. 2 re: References to other 
Resellers; (10) DHL's Motion in Limine No. 3 re; Hank Gibson December 18, 
2007, e-mail; (11) DHL's Motion in Limine No. 4 re: Public Relations 
Statements Prepared for Project Woodstock; (12) DHL's Motion in Limine 
No. 5 re: Post Termination Damages; (13) DHL's Motion to Dismiss Certain 
Franchisees for Failure to Prosecute; and (14) United/USSL's Motion to 
Strike Addendum to Expert Report of Dr. Greg Hallman Dated September 20, 
2010, and Related Testimony. 
Following the October 4, 2010, hearing, the parties again appeared 
before the Court on October 12, 2010. At the October 12th hearing, the 
Court made further inquiries into the legal issues raised in DHL's Motion 
for Summary Judgment on its Counterclaims. At the conclusion of the 
ildQ 
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Court's dialogue with counsel, it indicated its intent to grant this 
Motion and take the remaining Motions under further consideration. 
While the Court made certain observations during the dual hearings 
mentioned above, it will nevertheless address each parties' Motions 
herein.1 The Court notes that since taking this matter under advisement, 
it has had an opportunity to review the parties' legal authorities, 
rulings from other jurisdictions in cases involving DHL, the parties' 
written submissions and counsel's extensive oral argument. Being now 
fully informed, the Court rules as stated herein. 
At the outset, the Court notes that it will generally address the 
Motions in the order in which they were raised during the October 4th oral 
argument. Further, because of the number of Motions involved, the Court 
will avoid restating the parties' respective legal positions. Finally, 
it should be noted that United/USSL's Motion to Strike Addendum to Expert 
Report of Dr. Greg Hallman Dated September 20, 2010, has not been fully 
briefed, with the filing of a reply Memorandum still pending. 
Nevertheless, counsel addressed this Motion at the October 4th hearing, 
the Court has had the benefit of reviewing the moving and responding 
Memoranda concerning this Motion and will therefore rule on the Motion 
herein. 
1
 DHL's Motion to Dismiss Certain Franchisees will not be addressed because it is 
unopposed and has been granted. 
USS LOGISTICS V. DHL EXPRESS PAGE 5 * MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The Court turns to consider the merits of each of the parties' 
Motions, beginning with the Franchisee's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. The Court determines that Paragraph 5 of Amendment No. 1 of 
the Reseller Agreement is ambiguous and cannot be construed as a matter 
of law based on the four corners of the agreement- Specifically, DHL has 
persuaded the Court that a jury needs to consider whether the language 
in Paragraph 5 was intended to merely clarify that USSL would be 
permitted to have franchisees resell DHL's services on USSL's behalf or 
whether it was indeed intended to grant the Franchisees enforcement 
rights against DHL. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court considered the ruling in 
Avail Shipping, Inc. v. DHL Express (USA) , Inc. , a copy of which was 
provided to the Court by counsel for the Franchisees. Counsel had 
indicated during oral argument that the court in Avail had ruled that the 
franchisees in that case qualified as third-party beneficiaries under 
precisely the same language as Paragraph 5 in this case. However, upon 
close examination of that case, it appears that Amendment No. 1 to the 
Reseller Agreement in that case was different from the present case in 
that it stated: *This Agreement will be extended to United Shipping 
Solutions, LLC and their franchisees. . . t% (Emphasis added.) In this 
case, Paragraph 5 uses the term "'franchises, " rather than ^ franchisees." 
The Court believes that this variation is not a mere distinction without 
a difference. Indeed, counsel for DHL focused on the use of the term 
USS LOGISTICS V. DHL EXPRESS PAGE'S MEMORANDUM DECISION 
"franchises" in Paragraph 5 as a basis for his argument that there is no 
specific language in Amendment No. l to indicate an express or explicit 
intent to make the Reseller Agreement inure to the benefit of the 
Franchisees themselves. 
Further, the Court is satisfied that the parol evidence cited by the 
Franchisees highlights the factual issues regarding the parties' intent 
and understanding with respect to the language in Amendment No. 1. The 
differing views on what the language means and at least one deponent's 
uncertainty as to the meaning at all, confirms for the Court that these 
are issues which cannot be resolved on a summary judgment basis. 
Accordingly, the Franchisees' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is 
denied. 
Next, as indicated at the October 12th hearing, the Court grants 
DHL's Motion for Summary Judgment on its Counterclaims. The Court 
observes that it is undisputed that DHL continued to provide services to 
USSL's customers even after its announcement that it was terminating 
domestic shipping services. it is also undisputed that USSL accepted 
these services, but failed to pay for them for a period of time. 
Counsel for United/USSL has argued that DHL merely has an offset for 
any amounts outstanding because DHL repudiated the Reseller Agreement, 
thereby excusing or providing justification for USSL's subsequent failure 
to pay. The Court is not persuaded by this line of reasoning and instead 
concludes that USSL elected to keep the Reseller Agreement alive despite 
452 
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DHL's alleged breach by accepting the benefits of DHL's shipping 
services. Local 659, I.A.T.S.E. v. Color Corp, of America,302 P.2d 294 
(Sup.Ct.Cal. 1956). While USSL may have been the non-repudiating party 
to begin with, it ultimately defaulted on the Reseller Agreement by 
failing to pay for shipping services rendered in the time frame required, 
thereby creating in DHL the right to act upon that default through a 
direct breach of contract counterclaim and not merely as a set-off to the 
damages allegedly incurred by USSL/United. Silver Air v. Aeronautic Dev. 
Corp. , 656 P. Supp. 170, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing Taylor v. Johnston, 
539 P.2d 425, 430 (Sup.Ct.Cal. 1975)). Again, the Court is not persuaded 
that having accepted the benefit of the exchange under the Reseller 
Agreement, namely the receipt of shipping services, USSL is excused from 
its corresponding obligation of tendering payment as required under that 
Reseller Agreement. USSL's failure in this regard creates liability as 
a matter of law, in an amount to be determined at trial. DHL is therefore 
entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability under its breach 
of contract counterclaim.2 
2
 The Court notes that DHL's Mot ion in Limine No. 5 r e : Post Termination 
Damages and the por t ion of DHL's Motion for Summary Judgment concerning USSL's 
breach of contract counterclaim are inter-related in the sense that USSL's failure to pay DHL's 
invoices potentially created the basis for DHL's termination of the Reseller Agreement and, in 
turn, potentially precludes USSL from seeking damages beyond the date of that termination. The 
scope of permissible damages under these unique circumstances presents a complex set of issues 
which the Court reserves and will address in the context of the parties' proposed jury instructions 
on damages. 
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However, the Court denies DHL's Motion for Summary Judgment as to 
its "account stated" Counterclaims. The elements of these Counterclaims 
are clearly in dispute. For instance, it does not appear that there has 
been any express acknowledgment by USSL of indebtedness. USSL has merely 
acknowledged that Invoices were sent representing amounts claimed to be 
owing by DHL. Also, USSL disputes that the amounts invoiced are 
accurate. 
The Court next considers DHL's Motion in Limine No. l re: Documents 
Subject to the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine. To 
reiterate what was discussed in Court, counsel will meet and confer 
regarding the documents which are the subject of this Motion and submit 
for in camera review any documents which they cannot agree upon. The 
remaining documents are to be immediately returned to DHL. 
Next, the parties addressed DHL's Motion in Limine No. 2 re: 
References to Other Resellers. Upon further reflection, the Court 
determines that this Motion is granted and that United/USSL may only 
introduce evidence of system-wide issues or glitches with DHL's billing 
software and invoicing process, as it pertains to United/USSL's claims 
that they were not properly billed in this case. 
As to DHL's Motion in Limine No. 3 Re: Hank Gibson December 18, 
2007, email, the Court reserves judgment regarding Mr. Gibson's email 
pending the plaintiffs' ability to lay the predicate foundation, 
including how the contents of this email have relevance to the Project 
USS LOGISTICS V. DHL EXPRESS PAGE 9 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
ultimately carried out by DHL. Otherwise, the Court will grant DHL's 
Motion or require the email to be redacted. 
As to United/USSL's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Certain 
Claims and Defenses of DHL, the Court denies this Motion. The Court 
determines that DHL did not act wrongfully with respect to providing a 
Rule 30(b) (6) witness to testify regarding its affirmative defenses. The 
Court is not persuaded by the suggestion that a Rule 30(b) (6) witness is 
required to be schooled in the legal concepts surrounding affirmative 
defenses and then made to testify regarding the elements and factual 
underpinnings of such defenses. Further, to the extent that United/USSL 
believed otherwise, it should have raised these issues previously rather 
than going directly to seeking sanctions. 
As to United/USSL's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence Related to 
the Marioposa Lawsuit and Evidence Regarding Unasserted Claims, the Court 
determines that statements and testimony adduced in the "Mariposa" 
lawsuit may be used in the present action for the limited purpose of 
impeachment. The Court is not persuaded that such evidence, used in this 
limited purpose, is irrelevant or prejudicial. Accordingly, 
United/USSL's Motion is denied, as framed, but the evidence is limited 
nonetheless in the manner discussed herein. 
The Court next considers the dual Motion in Limine and Motion to 
Strike concerning portions of Dr. Hallman's report and Addendum. Counsel 
for United/USSL persuasively argued that DHL should have presented Dr. 
LJSS 
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Hallman's opinions regarding DHL's claims of offset and damages as part 
of an initial expert report by the August 9, 2010, deadline. However, 
the Court is not persuaded that there has been any actual prejudice, 
particularly since it appears that: Dr. Hallman's testimony in this regard 
is limited. In addition, the Addendum appears to merely provide the 
supplementation alluded to in Dr. Hallman's original Report. Finally, 
the Court is satisfied that the plaintiffs have had sufficient time to 
examine both the Report and Addendum and will, of course, have the 
opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Hallman at trial with respect to those 
areas of his opinion which they view to be faulty or incorrect. Clearly, 
these types of assertions go to the weight of Dr. Hallman's opinions and 
not their admissibility. Accordingly, United/USSL's Motion in Limine 
to Exclude Portions of Dr. Greg Hallman's Report and Testimony and their 
Motion to Strike Addendum to Expert Report of Dr. Greg Hallman Dated 
September 20, 2010, and Related Testimony are denied. 
Next, the Court denies United/USSL's Motion in Limine to Exclude 
Evidence of Damages of Defendant DHL: Foremost, the Court is not 
persuaded by United/USSL's position that Ms. Miller "did not know 
anything" about DHL's claimed damages. Indeed, having reviewed the 
entirety of Ms. Miller's testimony, attached as Exhibit L to the Maxfield 
Declaration, the Court is satisfied that Ms. Miller provided sufficient 
responses, particularly in light of the scope of the identified topics 
for her deposition. Finally, as DHL points out, to the extent that the 
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plaintiffs believe that Ms. Miller's testimony is lacking, that is a 
matter for cross-examination. 
Next, as to DHL's Motion in Limine No. 4 re: Public Relations 
Statements Prepared for Project Woodstock, before the Court will permit 
the plaintiffs to introduce the statements at issue, they must first 
establish how they are relevant to the specific claims of tortious 
interference and that they mitigated their damages. At this juncture, 
the probative value of these statements remains unclear and their 
prejudicial effect may ultimately be found to outweigh any such value. 
• Finally, the Court denies DHL's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Plaintiffs' Claims in the entirety. The Court is not persuaded that the 
plaintiffs' claims are preempted by the ADA or the FAAA and is satisfied 
that the reasoning in Judge Faust's Memorandum Decision, which reached 
the same conclusion, is sound. 
This Memorandum Decision will stand as the Order of the Court. 
Dated this / C) day of October, 2010. 
PAUL G. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
/ y c 7 
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